
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THE FORMATION OF CHARACTER

BY
ERNEST R. HULL, S.J.

WITH A PREFACE BY

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PREFACE

The most concise manner in which I can express my appreciation of the following pages of Father Hull is to say that I should like to see this little book placed in the hands of every young married couple very early in their married life, and carefully read by them in preparation for the serious duties of parenthood on which they are entering, and for which they will one day have to render a grave account. None the less ought it to be 'chewed and digested' by those who have the responsibilities of intellectual and moral parenthood—I mean the teachers of our boys and girls, in whose case the *in loco parentis* is no mere legal fiction. The present book is in one sense the sequel, in another sense the prelude, to Father Hull's admirable FORTIFYING THE LAYMAN, which I had the honour to introduce to the Catholic public by a brief preface in 1905.

Perhaps twenty six years of life as a schoolmaster tend to make one somewhat cynical; but I know that during that length of a scholastic career, I frequently thought (and I fear, said) that, from the point of view of education, the child's worst enemy is its parent. At least this is only too true in many cases; but such cases might be fewer by far if parents would learn wisdom from the teachings of Father Hull. Perhaps some portions of his book, especially the middle chapters,

may prove a little difficult reading for those who have not had the advantages of a training in scholastic philosophy and have no very clear ideas of psychological terms. Still, most fairly educated readers will, I think, follow without much difficulty the author's very clear and simple exposition of psychological facts connected with the development of children; whilst for educationalists, the subject ought to be familiar enough in these days of pedagogy, 'method' and 'child-study.' To such, I am inclined to think, THE FORMATION OF CHARACTER will prove acceptable, even beyond the pale of the Catholic Church.

May this admirable little treatise emulate, and even surpass, the success of its predecessor.

✠ LOUIS CHARLES,
Bishop of Salford.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

		PAGE.
I.	Introductory	1
II.	Characters, Principles and Ideals	11
III.	The Worldly Ideal	19
IV.	The Christian Ideal	32
V.	The All-round Ideal	42
VI.	The Baby, the Child and the Boy	51
VII.	Watching the Development	63
VIII.	Incipient Manhood	73
IX.	The Psychology of Habit	82
X.	The Physiology of Habit	92
XI.	The Rational Basis of Habit	101
XII.	Means of Training	110
XIII.	Informal Instruction	119
XIV.	Educational Failure	130
XV.	Informal Discipline and Example	140
XVI.	Moral Teaching in Schools	149
XVII.	Summary and Conclusion	162

THE FORMATION OF CHARACTER

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTORY

Among the various helpful notices of *Fortifying the Layman* there was one, on which I cannot lay hands now, which suggested the desirability of expanding the last section of that work entitled "Training the Young." It is notorious how little can be done with adult humanity where early training has been neglected, and bad habits have become so fixed as to resist all efforts at eradication. Now if, as was maintained in *Fortifying the Layman,* the disease at the back of religious indifference is generally a kind of mental atrophy, and it this mental atrophy is in great degree the outcome of a onesided education—then, assuming as we always do that education is a thing which properly belongs to the time of childhood, undoubtedly the corrective must at least begin there. It is in the tender years of life that the foundations of the future are laid. And since, according to the proverb, "prevention is better than cure," it is evidently on this early stage of existence that our exertions must chiefly be concentrated.

Four years have not proved too long for the maturing of an answer to this appeal; and it only required

an incident to bring the subject to the fore, and induce a vigorous plunge into the work. A few months ago a correspondent, the father of an incipient family, wrote asking for a book on the duties of parents. That was a man who realized his responsibilities and was looking round for aid to their fulfilment. It took some hunting about to find even the semblance of what was wanted. The best thing obtainable was two-thirds off the point as far as this case was concerned. Much space was devoted to platitudes on the privileges and duties of parents, the effects of good and bad example, etc.—the assumption being that parents in general were in the habit of getting drunk once a week, of swearing and quarreling and smashing furniture and the like—so that I really felt ashamed of sending such a volume to an upright, respectable Christian gentleman. Another part of the book was devoted to prayers and pious maxims, which were quite good in themselves, but again rather superfluous in this case. The remaining third part was a collection of practical hints as to things to be attended to and things to be avoided—again good in its way, but wanting in depth and system. This being the case I sent on the volume with an apology, and promised to tackle the subject myself as soon as circumstances would allow.

AN INITIAL OBJECTION

At first it seemed somewhat strange for one devoted by his profession to a life of celibacy to begin telling married people how to bring up their families. One of the stock objections raised against the celibacy of the Catholic clergy is precisely this—that through their

alienation from the domestic sphere they are incapable of entering sympathetically into the troubles and difficulties of the laity in connection with married life. A little reflection, however, soon showed how fallacious this objection was. In the first place, down to the moment of marriage the layman and the priest stand at par as regards experience. Every grown-up man has been a child, a boy, a youth himself. He has lived in the domestic circle of his own family, and witnessed the way in which family life is conducted. He knows how his father and mother behaved between themselves, and how they treated their children—and the young child is always sharp to observe and pass his own comments upon what he sees. Then secondly, every grown-up man has been through the usual school curriculum. He has seen how his masters dealt with their pupils, and has appreciated their good points and criticised their mistakes. Later on, the juvenile experience is augmented and matured by mixing socially among various other families besides his own. The amount and quality of matured judgment attained in such matters, say at the age of eighteen to twenty, will vary chiefly in proportion to the keenness with which facts have been observed, and the assiduity with which they have been assimilated. Down to this point, therefore, the layman who marries and the layman who joins the clergy have had equal chances. After this the experience of the newly married man begins to take a personal turn. But it is only gradually that he learns the right way, if he ever learns it at all. The priest, on the other hand, derives considerable advantage from the principles of ascetical, moral and pastoral theology,

which the layman has much less chance of acquiring. Moreover, most priests (especially members of the religious orders) undergo a course of teaching work in schools, where they have to take the place of parents towards a whole class of boys; and one year's experience in the school-room is worth a much longer term of experience in the home. Lastly, a priest is constantly visiting his people and receiving their confidence regarding domestic troubles; and thus he comes to know the workings of hundreds of families, whereas the married layman knows only one. In short—not to elaborate an argument which is obvious—I soon came to the conclusion that, given an average experience and an average power of profiting by it, a priest, in spite of his celibate state, is likely to be far better qualified to say how a family of children should be brought up than ninety-nine out of a hundred married laymen—whose experience often comes to maturity only after the whole family has been educated and sent out into the world, and whose mistakes become apparent only when it is too late. Under these considerations my diffidence soon vanished, and I put the objection aside.

A LIFELONG PROCESS

As soon as the subject was fairly tackled it began to expand. Before one can undertake the training of the young it is necessary to determine what the training is for. All training of the young has for its object to the making of future men; and before we can profitably set about the task, we must realize in the clearest terms what sort of men we want our children to be. Like an

architect, we have to draw the complete design of the building before we can determine the foundations. Thus the subject of the training of the young, if it is to be thoroughly essayed, becomes a mere appendix to a larger subject—the study of man.

This leads to another reflection. When we have fixed more or less what sort of men we want our children to be, it strikes us at once that there are very few actual specimens of adult humanity who answer to our model. Where the fault lies is not quite clear; but it marks our education as being to that extent a failure. Perhaps the explanation is this: We take for granted that training is only for the young; that it has its proper term, and then comes to an end. There lies the great fallacy. If we go back to primary principles, we see that the whole of this life is meant to be, and is, a probation; and probation is, or ought to be, a training. In other words, education, far from being the business of a few years, is properly the business of a lifetime. The only difference is this. Down to a certain age we undertake the training of others; after that age those "others" are supposed to undertake it for themselves. But even in the *status pupillaris* training, to be effectual, must not merely be an imposition from without. The child, the boy, the youth must take hisself in hand if anything worth having is to be attained. I think our methods are often radically at fault just because we lose sight of this. We look upon our children as so much putty, to be thumbed and squeezed and moulded by us into the shape we fancy; and we are only too happy if the putty takes the form we give it without resistance, and without flopping down into

a shapeless mass when the pressure of our hand is removed. On the contrary, trainers of the young ought to put the matter before themselves in this light:—"My work is to help this child, this boy, this youth, to train himself. I am here merely to show him at first how to do it; and my business is to get him to do it for himself without my aid as soon as possible." In other words, according to the French saying: "The business of a tutor is to make himself superfluous." We talk of a boy's education being completed, when we ought to talk of its being just begun; for when we go to the root of the matter all true training is self-training. As soon as a boy has learned to take up this self-training for himself, we have done with him; and the task thus assumed by him is meant to go on for the rest of his life.

It follows from this that the present series must embrace a far wider scope than that originally suggested. It must not merely serve as an aid to parents and school masters. The subject, as we conceive it, is one which will appeal strongly to all, whether old or young, who are interested in themselves, and who are in any way conscious of their own capabilities of betterment, and desirous of bringing those capabilities to effect.

SOURCES OF INFORMATION

The sources on which it is possible to draw in treating of this theme are threefold. (1) The first is "speculative psychology," or an abstract analysis of the nature of man, his faculties and powers, and the processes by which they work or are worked upon. This

abstract analysis has been done so thoroughly by the scholastics that no later efforts have succeeded in replacing them. It is true that non-Catholic psychology is in some respects divergent from the scholastic, sometimes even to the extent of theological heterodoxy; but in those parts which concern our subject there is a practical agreement—only the terminology is not always the same.

(2) The second source may be called "physiological psychology," a distinctly modern science. The moderns have not advanced on the scholastics in their abstract analysis, but they have opened new fields of knowledge by their experimental study of the brain and nervous system, and their working relations to mind. Since all functions of consciousness, even the most spiritual, are dependent on the physical organism as a vehicle both of reception and projection, the value of this study is inestimable. But what is most to our point is the growth, in recent years, of a large literature applying these results of physio-psychical research to the problem of training. We have devoured a considerable amount of this literature from time to time. But while acknowledging great indebtedness to it, we shall not load our pages with citations or references, since what we put forward is not intended to rest on authority, but to recommend itself simply by its manifest reasonableness. It will be enough to mention the one work used to brush up the subject for these papers—*The Teacher's Handbook of Psychology*, by James Sully (Longmans, 1906).

(3) The third source is practical knowledge of human nature as reflected in history and literature, and

in the observations of every-day life. This is undoubtedly the most important of the three. It affords the corrective for that narrowness which is likely to arise from theoretical studies, which treat of man in the abstract, and reduce him to a simplicity far removed from the actual conditions of his existence. It must never be forgotten that all our knowledge ultimately rests on the facts of experience, and that all sound philosophy is nothing else than these facts analyzed, and reduced to a system. Nevertheless, while the supreme value of practical experience in dealing with men must never be lost sight of—still the use of these abstract principles of philosophy does much to clarify experience, and to throw light on its meaning.

GENERAL NOTIONS

It will be safe to start with the following general notions, which are too obvious to call for discussion:—

(1) The immediate purpose of training is to superintend the development of latent human capabilities into activity, and then to direct them in sound and healthy lines, so as to attain the best results which circumstances allow.

(2) *General* training has for its object the development of all capacities in due harmony and proportion, so as to secure a well-balanced and allround result; while *special* training has for its object to bring one or other capacity into greater prominence, and to greater eminence of results.

(3) The method of training consists, first, in removing obstacles and providing opportunities till such time as the subject learns to overcome the first and to dis-

cover the second by himself; and secondly, in providing incitements where the development is deficient, and imposing restrictions where the development is excessive—again till such time as the subject learns to find his own incitements and exercise his own restraints. In other words, the supervision which is in the earlier states of development undertaken by others and imposed from without, has for its object to give a start for self-training, which should be encouraged to begin as soon as possible, and is meant to continue throughout life. In short, external training is always provisional, and must aim at making itself unnecessary as soon as possible.

(4) All training must be dominated by the end in view—that is to say, a clear idea of what sort of man*) we want the subject to become. This idea in its general form is based on a knowledge of the highest and best of which human nature has shown itself capable. But in the concrete, the general idea must be reduced down to what seems practically attainable in each particular case. This reduction will be determined by the circumstances under which the subject is likely to be placed, and the particular capacity or want of capacity which he exhibits. Hence the supervision includes a close observation of the subject as he develops, and prompt modifications of policy according to the exigencies of the case—the aim becoming more and more definite as the process goes on.

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* In order to avoid the pedantry of the "he (or she)" we shall speak throughout of the *boy* and the *man*. Application to the other sex, with or without modification, can be left to common sense.

These general notions being taken for granted, the order of our scheme will be to answer in turn the following questions:—

(1) What sort of result do we want our training to produce?

(2) What sort of material is given us out of which to produce that result?

(3) How are we to handle that material so as to bring the desired result about?

CHAPTER II

CHARACTERS, PRINCIPLES AND IDEALS

WHAT sort of men do we want our children to turn out?—that is the first question. A hundred people would give a hundred answers according to the limited standpoint of each. The business man would say: "I want my son to become a sucessful merchant"; the cultured man would say: "I want my son to become a perfect gentleman"; the religious-minded man would say: "I want my son to become an upright Christian"; the Catholic would say: "I want my son to become a model Catholic." All this is good as far as it goes, but it is too narrow. A more comprehensive view would be this:—"I want my son to become intellectually well-informed and clever, conscientious, and morally upright, sanely religious, strong and healthy, energetic and enterprising, cultivated in taste and feeling." This is a fairly good summary, but it does not quite meet our requirements. What we want is something more radical—some sterling thing or other which lies at the root of the best human nature, and embodies it. Our boy may become a very Hercules of physical health and strength, and yet a perfect dolt. He may be as clever as the devil—and yet as wicked. He may be as good as gold and pious as a saint, and yet a flabby, helpless creature. He may be the pink of aesthetic refinement and yet a sensual libertine. He may be a perfect genius and yet as fantastic as a goblin. The best

qualities in one line may be discounted or even cancelled by some glaring disability in another—the head of gold and the trunk of brass and the legs of iron and the feet of clay—a bundle of disparities rather than a man.

The first thing, therefore, we look for is a certain balance of parts—everything in its proper weight and measure. There may be coruscations of excellence besides—now in this direction and now in that; but these do not count for much unless there is a substantial building up the main structure proper to a man. There must be no glaring deficiencies, at least so far as training can prevent them. We look first for the substantials in each department—a fair equipment of knowledge, a fair intelligence, a fair judgment, a fair amount of moral strength and stamina, of energy and enterprise, of refinement and culture in due proportion to the status to which our family belongs—a golden mean, at least, in every part. This is so far pretty obvious, but it does not go deep enough. The thing we really want is CHARACTER.

THE MEANING OF CHARACTER

But the word needs defining. In common parlance we speak of all sorts of character—some of which we certainly do *not* want. We speak of good and bad character, strong and weak character, stable and unstable character, odd character, and no character. In this we are quite etymological without knowing it. For originally the word meant merely the mark impressed on a coin or seal, indicating its nature and value, and distinguishing it from others; and thus in its applied

sense character comes to mean marked individuality. Experience shows that people can be both good and bad, weak and strong, *with* or *without* a marked individuality—and therefore with or without character. Now the end and aim of our training is not merely to make our children good and strong, but to ensure and develop in them a *character* which shall be good and strong. Parents and trainers of the young are of course fully alive to the idea of turning out their subjects good and strong; but often enough they plaster goodness and strength on from the outside in the hope that it will stick, quite regardless of the structure underneath. Plastering will last no longer than the wall which it overlays; if the wall be of mud it will be preserved for a time by the veneer; but before long it will crumble away, and down comes the house, plaster and all. What we want is not a mere plastering business, but strong walls of cut-stone which need no plaster, and will stand till the day of doom. And this solid cut-stone structure spells "character."

I define character (in the sense required) as *life dominated by principles.* The terms are pregnant. Life comprises thoughts, words and actions; but the question is, how are thoughts, words and actions determined? Directly and immediately they spring from the spontaneous vitality of the organism; but what is the ulterior cause which sets the organism going, and determines its direction and results?

The man of no character thinks, speaks and acts just as the impulse seizes him, whether for good or bad; or, if there be anything of reasonable motive behind, this is determined by chance or circumstances rather

than by any reflex and stable purpose. If there is any consistency about his life, this is due simply to the fact that his impulses or his circumstances are more or less the same all the year round, or because he has got into a groove, and lacks initiative and originality. The life of such a man may be good or bad according as good or bad impulses happen to predominate internally, or good or bad influences bear upon him externally. Possibly he may do nothing very wrong, either because he has not enough spirit to be really wicked, or because he is afraid of being caught, or simply because he feels no inclination that way. He may be an innocent creature enough, but he will not rise to anything worthy of the name of virtue, still less to anything like eminence in virtue. He is, in short, more or less what he finds himself—the passive instrument of his internal dispositions and his outward circumstances, and their comfortable (or uncomfortable) slave. His life consists of a succession of thoughts, words and actions following each other more or less at random—a series of phenomena strung together loosely, or not at all, and so promiscuous that they cannot be reduced to a unity or summed up as a whole. Such is the man without character.

On the contrary, the life of a man of character is a decided unity—something knit firmly together into a consistent whole;—not rigid or unelastic necessarily, but still a unified structure. The man of character has his impulses, and his circumstances too, both of which try to dominate him just as in case of the "other fellow." But his attitude towards both is different. It is the attitude of a master, not of a slave—a dominating,

ruling, directing attitude, which uses both impulses and circumstances as amenable to his own purposes, and makes them his tools. There is a calculation, a deliberateness about him which the creature without character has not got. He may be a good man or a bad man, but he will be *masterfully* good or bad. He may indulge his evil impulses as the "other fellow" does; but if so, it is with deliberation and set purpose. He may also restrain his impulses; but if so, this will not be out of a weak fear of being caught, or a dread of unpleasant consequences, but out of deliberate policy and set purpose, because he has an object in view. In other words, the man of character is a man ruled not by impulse or circumstances byt by internal motives—in short, his life is dominated by principles. These principles may be good or bad, right or wrong. But there they are; and it is due to their presence that he is what he is, and *consistently* what he is. That is what we mean by a man of character.

THE MEANING OF PRINCIPLES

What then is a principle? A principle is some pregnant idea relating to conduct, grasped firmly by the mind, branded in consciousness, brooded over, elevated into standard of action, and applied habitually to circumstances as they arise. A principle means something more than a rule. By a rule we generally mean some cut-and-dried positive enactment, defining in clear terms what shall be done and what shall not be done under certain circumstances. Its application is rigidly according to the letter; and it is only necessary to understand what the rule says in order to exe-

cute it. Given average intelligence, and the disposition to obey, the rule works just like a slot-machine—put in the coin, and out comes the cigarette or stick of chocolate. So in like manner, whenever the circumstances contemplated in the rule arise, it is merely a matter of implicit obedience to carry it out. If under unusual circumstances the execution of the rule becomes impossible or unadvisable, the rule is *broken*, even though advisably and justifiably. It is quite otherwise with principles. A principle is some great general idea to be understood according to its spirit, and to be applied with discretion. If circumstances arise under which it is desirable to leave the principle aside, the principle itself is not broken. For it is of the nature of a principle to be discretionary in its application; and the laying of it aside is in fact nothing else but the bringing of some other and more radical principle to bear on the case, to which the more subordinate principle must give place. This point will engage our attention more in detail in the sequel. At present it is enough to have indicated it. We may add that principles and rules can shade off into one another; and that the same maxim can become either a rule or a principle according as it is conceived rigidly in the letter or elastically in the spirit—or again, according as it is applied mechanically or with deliberative discretion.

THE MEANING OF IDEALS

Treating of principles brings us to the question of *ideals*. By an ideal we mean some type of excellence which we imagine as possible or desirable, and which

we aspire to realize in our life. There can be bad and good ideals, healthy and morbid ideals, possible and impossible ideals. Ideals are formed in various ways, but always empirically. Sometimes they are suggested by reading about some towering personality, such as Napoleon or Newman; sometimes they are made up piecemeal out of the different qualities which we have come across in our living fellow-men, which we admire and would fain imitate, and which we gradually join together and construct into a whole. However it come about, the resultant ideal is always reducible to a certain type of *character;*—and character, as we have seen, is life dominated by principles. So in the end it comes to this. Our ideal, reduced to definite terms, is nothing other than the group of principles which we have set our heart upon as the guiding standards of our life; and the pursuit of our ideal is nothing else than the cherishing of these principles and their assiduous application.

It is this second item to which we must attach the chief importance. There are plenty of people whose minds are filled with ideals, and those often of the most exalted kind. But they never get beyond the stage of admiration, or at most a sort of *velleity*—a wish to have it, but an indisposition to go through the labour of attaining it. This is a bogus idealism—a delusion and a snare. But there are others who, actuated by a like aspiration, do really make efforts towards its attainment; but who, through want of strength, or perhaps through difficulties of temperament and circumstances, make a poor show for their exertions. Nevertheless the genuine thing begins as soon as exertion

appears on the scene. In this case every encouragement is to be given to persevere—unless the ideal is something manifestly impossible; and then it should be humbly watered down.

So now we have reached the answer to our first question—

(1) The end and aim of training is (generically) to produce men of character, and (specifically) men of the best and noblest character which circumstances and the capacity of the subject will allow.

(2) Character is life dominated by principles, as distinguished from life dominated by mere impulses from within and mere circumstances from without.

(3) Principles are ethical conceptions deeply rooted in the mind, elevated into standards of conduct, and consistently applied to life.

(4) A collection of principles covering all departments of life constitutes an ideal. A man of principles is therefore a man with an ideal.

(5) There cannot be character without some ideal, but there can often be an ideal without character. To be effective, an ideal must not be merely pictured, admired and longed for. It must be embodied in a set of definite principles dominating life, and then it will result in character.

(6) The great business of training therefore is, first, to lay before the child the best and noblest possible ideal; secondly, to get that ideal stamped into his mind in the concrete form of sound principles; thirdly, so firmly to establish the habit of acting according to those principles that it will last for the rest of his life.

CHAPTER III

THE WORLDLY IDEAL

Before passing on to our second question, and as a preparation for it, we must now look more closely into the elements which go to the making up of that "ideal" which is the goal of all our training. Taken comprehensively our aim will be, as far as is practically possible, to equip our subject with all the elements of excellence of which human nature is capable. As regards physique we want him to be healthy and strong, agile in limb and dexterous in the use of his members. In the department of mind he must be well equipped with suitable knowledge, bright and intelligent in the use of it, sound, clear, and accurate in judgment, conscious of his own limitations, neither too cock-sure nor too diffident, and capable of acquiring fresh knowledge as well as making use of the old. We want him to be firm and consistent, but not too rigid or obstinate; capable of making up his mind on reasoned grounds, and of adhering to his resolution, but also capable of changing that resolution in view of better knowledge. In the department of feeling we want him to be susceptible and delicate without being touchy or morbid, and always master of his emotions. In the department of manners we want him to be refined according to his proper status, polite and attractive, genial without the loss of proper reserve. In the aesthetic department we wish for a proper standard of taste. In the ethical de-

partment we look for sound principles of conduct and a steadfast conformity of conduct to those principles. In the department of religion we look for a sane and healthy piety free from fanaticism, and a lively faith free from superstition.

This general outline, which might be worked out into detail, is sufficient for our present purpose. To what extent and in what degree the various elements it contains are to be striven for will in some cases depend on two considerations—first and foremost, the social status of those who fall under training; and secondly, the capacity of the individual. Some of the elements above enumerated will be proper for all alike. Sound health, sound knowledge, sound morals, sound religion, are things which must enter into the programme wherever education is taken up. Knowledge, however, will vary in its range according to circumstances; and this is still more the case with the embellishments of manners and taste.

The interests of health and knowledge are so obvious, and so assidously attended to in educational circles nowadays, that little or nothing more need be said about them here. We shall do better by attending to those elements which have the closest bearing on character — without which all other accomplishments are more than half worthless. In the civilized world of to-day—I am speaking of the European sphere of course—there are two ideals striving for the mastery—the religious ideal and the worldly ideal. The religious ideal is to be a perfect Christian, the worldly ideal is to be a perfect gentleman. From one point of view the two ideals would seem to be similar, from another point

of view they are altogether different. And the difference lies primarily in this:—To the Christian idealist the religious element is essential; to the worldly idealist it is a matter of indifference. Belief in Christ and His revelation, personal loyalty to Him, a personal surrender of our will to His will, the acceptance of Him as a living, heaven-sent model to which it is our highest aspiration to conform—these are the fundamental ideas without which the Christian ideal must cease to exist. In the worldly idea a man may perhaps be a perfect gentleman and a perfect Christian as well, but he may also be an agnostic or a negationist or a materialist, or anything else he likes—and the world is not concerned, so long as the accepted standard of "the gentleman" is maintained. In other words, the worldly idea of a gentleman is restricted to a certain catalogue of qualities which make for social attractiveness—honesty, truthfulness, self-respect, self-control, courteous regard for the feelings of others, refinement of taste, and pleasingness of deportment. We must not of course set the worldly ideal lower than it really is. It does demand a number of sterling natural qualities, and is not satisfied that they should be merely an exterior mask. It is therefore something good as far as it goes, and something which even the Christian cannot afford to despise. Its limitations are however twofold.. As regards morality it does not consider a gentleman to be discredited by certain defects in ethical principle which a Christian could never tolerate. Secondly, as we have said, it makes religion a matter of indifference. There was at time when it was considered decidedly shocking to meet an atheist, and some pro-

fession of belief was one of the ingredients of respectability. But nowadays this fashion has passed away, and it is a matter of no discredit at all for a gentleman to be at the same time an unbeliever, so long as he is not a blatant and vulgar one—in other words, so long as he does not outrage the canons of good taste.

NEWMAN'S GENTLEMAN.

The admirable way in which Newman (Idea of a University, Discourse VIII) works out the subject relieves us from the task of an independent analysis. The whole chapter should be read by all; but for our purpose it will be sufficient to weave together some of the more important passages:—

I spoke just now of the scorn and hatred which a cultivated mind feels for some kinds of vice, and the utter disgust and profound humiliation which may come over it, if it should happen in any degree to be betrayed into them. Now this feeling may have its root in faith and love, but it may not; there is nothing really religious in it, considered by itself. Conscience indeed is implanted in the breast by nature, but it inflicts upon us fear as well as shame; when the mind is simply angry with itself and nothing more, surely the true import of the voice of nature and the depth of its intimations have been forgotten, and a false philosophy has misinterpreted emotions which ought to lead to God.

The less amiable specimens of this spurious religion are those which we meet not unfrequently in my own country. We find men possesed of many virtues, but

proud, bashful, fastidious, and reserved. Why is this? It is because conscience to them is not the word of a lawgiver, as it ought to be, but the dictate of their own minds and nothing more; it is because they do not look beyond their own minds in their Maker, but are engrossed in notions of what is due to themselves, to their own dignity and their own consistency. Their conscience has become a mere self-respect. When they do wrong, they feel, not contrition, of which God is the object, but remorse, and a sense of degradation. They call themselves fools, not sinners; they are angry and impatient, not humble. They shut themselves up in themselves; it is misery to them to think or to speak of their own feelings; it is misery to suppose that others see them, and their shyness and sensitiveness often become morbid. They are victims of an intense self-contemplation.

The heresy of which I speak is the substitution of a moral sense or taste for conscience in its true meaning. It is especially congenial to men of an imaginative and poetical cast of mind, who will readily accept the notion that virtue is nothing more than the graceful in conduct Such persons, far from tolerating fear, as a principle, in their apprehension of religious and moral truth, will not be slow to call it simply gloom and superstition. A gentleman's religion is of a liberal and generous character; it is based upon honour; vice is evil, because it is unworthy, despicable, and odious. This was the quarrel of the ancient heathen with Christianity, that instead of simply fixing the mind on the fair and the pleasant, it intermingled other ideas of a sad and painful

nature; that it spoke of tears before joy, a cross before a crown; that it laid the foundation of heroism in penance; that it made the soul tremble with the news of Purgatory and Hell; that it insisted on views and a worship of the Deity, which to their minds was nothing else than mean, servile, and cowardly. The notion of an All-perfect, Ever-present God, in whose sight we are less than atoms, and who, while He deigns to visit us, can punish as well as bless, was abhorrent to them; they made their own minds their sanctuary, their own ideas their oracle, and conscience in morals was but parallel to genius in art, and wisdom in philosophy.

Lord Shaftesbury has drawn out the idea in a theoretical form, in his celebrated collection of Treatises which he has called "Characteristics of men, manners, opinions, views." His first attack is directed against the doctrine of reward and punishment, as if it introduced a notion into religion inconsistent with the true apprehension of the beauty of virtue, and with the liberality and nobleness of spirit in which it should be pursued. The motives of hope and fear being put far into the background, and nothing being morally good but what springs simply or mainly from a love of virtue for its own sake, this love-inspiring quality in virtue is its beauty, while a bad conscience is not much more than the sort of feeling which makes us shrink from an instrument out of tune. Accordingly, virtue being only one kind of beauty, the principle which determines what is virtuous is, not conscience, but *taste*. Hence conscience, which intimates a Lawgiver, being superseded by a moral

taste or sentiment, which has no sanction beyond the constitution of our nature, it follows that our one great rule is to contemplate ourselves, if we would gain a standard of life and morals.

Taking these specimens of what I call the religion of Philosophy, it is obvious that there is no doctrine contained in them which is not in a certain sense true; yet, on the other hand, that almost every statement is perverted and made false, because it is not the whole truth. There are exhibitions of truth under one aspect, and therefore insufficient; conscience is most certainly a moral sense, but it is more; vice again, is a deformity, but it is worse. Lord Shaftesbury may insist, if he will, that simple and solitary fear cannot effect a moral conversion; but he will have a difficulty in proving that any real conversion follows from a doctrine, which makes virtue a mere point of good taste, and vice vulgar and ungentlemanlike.

Such a doctrine is essentially superficial, and such will be its effects. It has no better measure of right and wrong than that of visible beauty and tangible fitness. To *seem* becomes to *be*; what looks fair will be good, what causes offence will be evil; virtue will be what pleases, vice what pains. It is detection, not the sin, which is the crime; private life is sacred, and inquiry into it is intolerable; and decency is virtue. Scandals, vulgarities, whatever shocks, whatever disgusts, are offences of the first order. Drinking and swearing, squalid poverty, improvidence, laziness, slovenly disorder, make up the idea of profligacy; poets may say anything, however wicked, with impunity; works of genius may be read without danger

or shame, whatever their principles; fashion, celebrity, the beautiful, the heroic, will suffice to force any evil upon the community. The splendors of a court, and the charms of good society, wit, imagination, taste, and high breeding, the *prestige* of rank, and the resources of wealth, are a screen, an instrument, and an apology for vice and irreligion. And thus at length we find, surprising as the change may be, that that very refinement of Intellectualism, which began by repelling sensuality, ends by excusing it.

St. Paul gives us a pattern of evangelical perfection. He draws the Christian character in its most graceful form, and its most beautiful hues. He discourses of that charity which is patient and meek, humble and single-minded, disinterested, contented, and persevering. He tells us to prefer each the other before himself, to give way to each other, to abstain from rude words and evil speech, to avoid self-conceit, to be calm and grave, to be cheerful and happy, to observe peace with all men, truth and justice, courtesy and gentleness, all that is modest, amiable, virtuous, and of good repute. Such is St. Paul's exemplar of the Christian in his external relations; and I repeat, the school of the world seems to send out living copies of this typical excellence with greater success than the Church. At this day the "gentleman" is the creation, not of Christianity, but of civilization. But the reason is obvious. The world is content with setting right the surface of things; the Church aims at regenerating the very depths of the heart. She ever begins with the beginning; and, as regards the multitude of her children is never able to get beyond

the beginning, but is continually employed in laying the foundation. She is curing men and keeping them clear of mortal sin; she is "treating of justice and chastity, and the judgment to come"; she is insisting on faith and hope, and devotion, and honesty, and the elements of charity; and has so much to do with precept that she almost leaves it to inspirations from Heaven to suggest what is of counsel and perfection. She is putting souls in the way of salvation, that they may then be in a condition, if they shall be called upon, to aspire to the heroic and to attain the full proportions, as well as the rudiments of the beautiful.

Such is the method, or the policy (so to call it) of the Church; but Philosophy looks at the matter from a very different point of view: what have Philosophers to do with the terror of judgment or the saving of the soul?

The embellishment of the exterior is almost the beginning and the end of philosophical morality. This is why it aims at being modest rather than humble; this is how it can be proud at the very time that it is unassuming. This is true humility, to feel and to behave as if we were low; not to cherish a notion of our importance, while we effect a low position. It is an abdication, as far as our own thoughts are concerned, of those prerogatives or privileges to which others deem us entitled. Now contrast with this idea the meaning of the word "condescension", and you will at once see the difference between the world's humility and the humility of the Gospel. As the world uses the word, "condescension" is a stooping indeed of the person, but a bending forward, unattended with the slightest

effort to leave the seat in which it is so firmly established. It is the act of a superior, who protests to himself, while he commits it, that he is a superior still, and that he is doing nothing else but an act of grace towards those on whose level, in theory, he is placing himself.

Pride under such training, instead of running to waste in the education of the mind, is turned to account; it gets a new name; it is called self-respect, and ceases to be the disagreeable, uncompanionable quality which it is in itself.

Refined by the civilization which has brought it into activity, this self-respect infuses into the mind an intense horror of exposure, and a keen sensitiveness of notoriety and ridicule. It becomes the enemy of extravagances of any kind; it shrinks from what are called scenes; it has no mercy on the mock-heroic, on pretence or egotism, on verbosity in language, or what is called prosiness in conversation. It detests gross adulation; not that it tends at all to the eradication of the appetite to which the flatterer ministers, but it sees the absurdity of indulging it, it understands the annoyance thereby given to others; and if a tribute must be paid to the wealthy or the powerful, it demands greater subtlety and art in the preparation. Thus vanity is changed into a more dangerous self-conceit, as being checked in its natural eruption. It teaches men to suppress their feelings, and to control their tempers, and to mitigate both the severity and the tone of their judgments.

Hence it is that it is almost a definition of a gentleman to say he is one who never inflicts pain. This de-

scription is both refined and, as far as it goes, accurate. He is mainly occupied in merely removing the obstacles which hinder the free and unembarrassed action of those about him; and he concurs with their movements rather than takes the initiative himself. He carefully avoids whatever may cause a jar or a jolt in the minds of those with whom he is cast;—all clashing of opinion, or collision of feeling, all restraint, or suspicion, or gloom, or resentment; his great concern being to make every one at their ease and at home. He has his eyes on all his company; he is tender towards the bashful, gentle towards the distant, and merciful towards the absurd; he can recollect to whom he is speaking; he guards against unseasonable allusions, or topics which may irritate; he is seldom prominent in conservation, and never wearisome. He makes light of favors while he does them, and seems to be receiving when he is conferring. He never speaks of himself except when compelled, never defends himslf by a mere retort, he has no ears for slander or gossip, scrupulous in imputing motives to those who interfere with him, and interprets everything for the best. He is never mean or little in his disputes, never takes unfair advantage, never mistakes personalities or sharp sayings for arguments, or insinuates evil which he dare not say out. From a long-sighted prudence, he observes the maxim of the ancient sage, that we should ever conduct ourselves towards our enemy as if he were one day to be our friend. He has too much good sense to be affronted by insults, he is too well employed to remember injuries, and too indolent to bear malice. He is patient, forbearing and resigned, on philosophical principles; he submits to pain

because it is inevitable, to bereavement because it is irreparable, and to death because it is his destiny. If he engages in controversy of any kind, his disciplined intellect preserves him from the blundering discourtesy of better, perhaps, but less educated minds; who, like blunt weapons, tear and hack instead of cutting clean, who mistake the point in argument, waste their strength on trifles, mis-conceive their adversary, and leave the question more involved than they find it. He may be right or wrong in his opinion, but he is too clear-headed to be unjust; he is as simple as he is forcible, and as brief as he is decisive. Nowhere shall we find greater candor, consideration, indulgence; he throws himself into the minds of his opponents, he accounts for their mistakes. He knows the weakness of human reason as well as its strength, its province and its limits. If he be an unbeliever, he will be too profound and large-minded to ridicule religion or to act against it; he is too wise to be a dogmatist or a fanatic in his infidelity. He respects piety and devotion; he even supports institutions as venerable, beautiful, or useful, to which he does not assent; he honors the ministers of religion, and it contents him to decline its mysteries without assailing or denouncing them. He is a friend of religious toleration, and that, not only because his philosophy has taught him to look on all forms of faith with an impartial eye, but also from the gentleness and effeminacy of feeling, which is the attendant on civilization.

Not that he may not hold a religion too, in his own way, even when he is not a Christian. In that case his religion is one of imagination and sentiment; it is the

embodiment of those ideas of the sublime, majestic, and beautiful, without which there can be no large philosophy. Sometimes he acknowledges the being of God, sometimes he invests an unknown principle or quality with the attributes of perfection. And this deduction of his reason, or creation of his fancy, he makes the occasion of such excellent thoughts, and the starting-point of so varied and systematic a teaching, that he even seems like a disciple of Christianity itself. From the very accuracy and steadiness of his logical powers, he is able to see what sentiments are consistent in those who hold any religious doctrine at all, and he appears to others to feel and to hold a whole circle of theological truths, which exist in his mind no otherwise than as a number of deductions.

Such (concludes Newman) are some of the lineaments of the ethical character, which the cultivated intellect will form, apart from religious principle.

CHAPTER IV

THE CHRISTIAN IDEAL

THE Christian ideal comprises all that is excellent in the worldly ideal, correcting its superficialities and crookednesses wherever they exist, but above all, making up its deficiencies and raising the whole to a higher plane. It is of the utmost importance at this stage to emphasize the truth so much insisted upon in our standard theology, that the supernatural does not destroy or cancel the natural, but presupposes it, adds to it and sublimates it. Christ did not come to destroy the substantial realities even of the Old Law, still less the substantial realities of nature. He came to fulfill them both. The great bulk of his teaching, on ethical subjects at least, consists in re-enforcing the main principles of nature, clarifying them, and imparting a deeper insight into them. And where his maxims seem to run counter to the dictates of nature, it is nature corrupted or weakened, and not nature in its perfection which he antagonizes. It must not be forgotten too, that all virtues, even the supernatural ones, are *radically and functionally* natural virtues—the supernaturality added to them consisting either in a higher illumination and impulsion beneath the surface, or else a higher reflex motive above the surface of the mind. Thus the supernatural forces vouchsafed to us have for their object the perfecting of human nature as well as elevating it.

Nay, even further, the living personality of Christ himself, as manifested to us, is a human personality,* and only perceptible by us in the terms of nature. For the supernatural, according to the maxim of the schools, does not fall under the perception of our senses—*gratia non cadit sub perceptione.*

CHRIST AS OUR MODEL

For the Christian, therefore, Christ, as manifested to us sensibly through his words and actions, is our model and our ideal. This ideal has the advantages of appearing before us ready-made, and in a concrete and living form, and is all the more calculated to influence us on that account. It is a universal model, in that there is no phase of our life which it does not illustrate and provide guidance for. But it needs intelligent interpretation. We know what Christ was, and what he did under certain circumstances; but we know also that Christ's circumstances were not always the same as ours. Thus his severe denunciations of the Scribes and Pharisees should not lead to a literal imitation in this particular—the fact of his divine knowledge reading the hearts of men, and also the fact of his divine commission to perform a certain work on earth, justifying in him a severity of speech which would not be justifiable in ourselves. Similarly if we take those actions of his which were the outcome of a supernatural power, we recognize our inability to imitate him in this respect. But we can at least fall back on the *spirit* of his action—which was, to use whatever

* We use personality here in the popular, not in the heological sense.

talents and powers he possessed, never for his own selfish convenience, but always for the good of others. In taking Christ as our ideal we are bound, by the necessity of the case, to reduce his divine traits to the terms of human capability. We cannot forgive sins against God, but we can pardon offences against ourselves. We cannot cure the sick, but we can alleviate their sufferings. We cannot multiply loaves, but we can give a loaf where it is needed. We cannot spend the night in prayer on the mountains, but we can cultivate the spirit of communion with God at all times, and pray with attention when we pray at all. We cannot teach with authority, but we can put in a word of useful instruction where occasion offers. We cannot die for mankind, but we can put ourselves to some inconvenience for our neighbors. We cannot undergo the scourging and the crowning, but we can bear a toothache without becoming ill-tempered and making everyone miserable around us—and we can put up with a bit of mockery without letting out and rampaging like a wounded lion. We cannot redeem mankind from sin, but we can make efforts to further the fruits of the redemption by avoiding sin ourselves, and doing what we can to draw our neighbor to a better life—and so on through the list. Everywhere we can reduce Christ's example to the humbler terms of ordinary human life, and out of the result, combined with specific points of his moral teaching, can construct for ourselves the *idea* which, ever haunting our mind, is to be studied and realized, or at least consistently aspired to, in the conduct of our lives.

To work out the elements of this ideal would lead us into nothing short of a treatise on the whole catalogue of the Christian and the natural virtues—a work which would be superfluous while dealing only with general principles. Lest however it be imagined that we are proposing as the object of training the young an aim which is exclusively moral and religious, we hasten to disclaim this intention, and to repeat that the scope of our training is *the whole man* in all his aspects, physical, intellectual, volitional, emotional, æsthetical and social. Hence it follows that we cannot afford to be narrow in our conceptions. We must of course regard the spirit of religiousness as something which should pervade our whole lives, and therefore pervade the whole process of our training. But this does not prevent us from doing full justice to other departments which are in themselves purely secular—drawing from the sources of human experience everything which will in any way help to build up our ideal and aid in its realization. Hence it is that we devoted so much space to the consideration of the worldly ideal—not in order to carp at it, or even (as Newman does) to pass strictures on its deficiences; but in order that we may perceive all the excellences that are in it, and embrace them and make them our own.

CHRISTIAN AND GENTLEMAN

Our meaning will best be seen by the following. It would be a striking absurdity to say that a Christian would be the worse for being a gentleman.—On the contrary, what we maintain is that a perfect Christian must be a perfect gentleman, in every substantial

sense of the word. If he is a rustic he will not be expected to possess refinements of culture, manners and taste entirely unknown to his class, and which would make him like an ass in a lion's skin. And yet the substantial realities of a gentleman can all be there—honesty, truthfulness, self-respect, and self-control, consideration for the feelings of others, and the rest. One of the greatest gentlemen in this substantial sense I ever met was a certain yokel named Lawrence, who looked after the garden at Stonyhurst, and used to be requisitioned as a server at dinner on feast-days. I used to watch that man as he went round with an innate grace unequalled by any trained butler I ever knew; and it was nothing short of astonishing to see the refinement and delicacy of his attentions—all so natural and genial, and not the least bit "put on." Under the most vexatious circumstances he was always serene—not the sereneness of stupidity, but the natural expression of a soul always tranquil, and ennobled by innate religiousness. One concrete example like this is worth a ream of elaborate philosophizing. It is a monumental proof of the refinement which springs naturally out of a simple Christian life, and a living object-lesson to people with ten times the pretensions to high breeding.

I could enumerate a large number of like instances which came in my way some years ago in Ireland. English people as a rule look upon the Irish peasantry as a set of savages; but for my part I never came across such a degree of innate refinement among any class of people, high or low, as I found amongst the poor half-starved cabin-dwellers in the midst of the Bog of

Allan. It is my intention some day to write out my reminiscences of that sojourn. All I want to insist upon just now is the extraordinary refining influence of Catholicism—for there is certainly no other cause at work in this instance—on even the humblest classes, so long as they live in a purely Catholic atmosphere and are not contaminated by the artificialities and corruptions of worldly civilization.

The outcome of it is therefore, first and obviously, that a Christian is none the worse Christian for being a gentleman; secondly, and almost as obviously, that a Christian *ought* above all other men to be a gentleman; thirdly, and perhaps not at all obviously, a Christian cannot be a perfect Christian *unless* he is a gentleman.

The last point is, I say, perhaps far from obvious, and stands in need of elucidation. Putting aside mere conventional or æsthetical refinements, no one can fail to have observed that what from the religious point of view is called "acting like a Christian" is in thousands of cases simply identical with what from the worldly point of view is called "acting like a gentleman"; and a failure in Christian virtue is, in all such cases, inseparable from a failure in gentlemanliness. Between *worldliness* and Christianity there is of course a manifest opposition; but between Christian and gentleman there ought to be none at all, but rather an identity.

This brings us again to our often-repeated principle, that the supernatural is not opposed to nature, but presupposes it, perfects it and elevates it. The ideal of a gentleman, though undoubtedly acquired (in Europe at least) through the influence of Christianity,

is in itself a natural acquisition, and one which can stand without any explicit appeal to religion. Thus the natural "ideal man" is something which works upon the better feelings of humanity by reason of its own attractiveness. Unselfishness, courtesy, consideration for others, refinement of mind and speech, courage, consistency and the rest—all these qualities have their own intrinsic loveliness, and win admiration on their own account.

The difference between the natural gentleman and the Christian gentleman—assuming each to be more or less perfect in his own line—does not consist so much in the moral virtues practiced, nor yet in the adornments of mind or manner, which are the same in both cases. The difference is one of motive—the natural gentleman being what he is simply and solely because of the intrinsic attractiveness of the qualities he adopts, while the Christian gentleman—besides this motive, which of course he ought not to despise but ought to appreciate—adds the reflex motive of living in harmony with God's will according to the model given by Christ. Thus the whole paraphernalia of culture and refinement and moral excellence is elevated into the higher dignity of personal religious service.

It was Newman, I think, who defined vulgarity as "the greatest of vices because the compound of so many small ones", and the same author somewhere remarks that to be a perfect gentleman is one of the greatest aids to being a perfect Christian. For although religious motives are the highest and noblest, and supernaturally religious motives the highest of all, it is still a fact that they often possess a much weaker hold on

us than natural motives—even though these, excellent in themselves, are so much lower than the others. As one of my professors once expressed it—"In proportion as the highest motive is above the lowest, so in inverse proportion it is the less efficacious." For instance, a man will gladly bear sufferings and hardships for £100, which he could never be got to tolerate for the love of God. The reason is a simple one. Natural motives are efficacious just because they are natural—that is, because they are rooted in our own nature; while supernatural motives are inefficacious just because they are so remote from our nature, so far above it—being as they are invisible and intangible, dimly grasped, and that only by faith.

HARNESSING THE NATURAL.

Now the point we want to come at is this. We may have a certain appreciation of this higher or religious motive, and yet find it far from effectual in influencing our lives; whereas the idea of being a gentleman on natural grounds is something more tangible and concrete, and will therefore appeal to us much more strongly just because it is natural. What then we have to do, is to make use of this natural motive as a means of rising towards a higher life—to harness it, as it were, to the chariot of the supernatural, so as to increase the speed and steadiness of our going forward.

Therefore, when it is a question of forming character by building up the Christian ideal, and by embodying it in the form of principles, this must not be lost sight of. The ideal man must be a gentleman in the full natural sense of the word; and to the ideal of the

natural gentleman must be added the supernatural ideal of the Christian, so as to combine both into the Christian gentleman. To teach the young to be gentlemen,—understanding the word in its true essential sense, quite apart from the peculiar requirements of any particular rank or social status—is therefore a substantial part of Christian training; in fact, the substructure on which the ideal Christian is to be built.

This brings into our ideal a great many things which at first sight would seem to be hardly religious in character. I mean such qualities as self-reliance, self-respect, the sense of honour (as distinguished from honesty), punctuality, fidelity to engagements, regard for the reasonable wishes and expectations of others, culture and refinement of mind and manners, besides such personal accomplishments as circumstances may dictate or allow. All these things are natural; but most of them can be reduced down to some kind of virtue. For example, self-reliance may include any amount of fortitude and temperance; self-respect involves magnanimity, etc., honor is reducible to truthfulness and honesty; energy and enterprise are reducible to the duty of making the most of one's talents; punctuality is reducible to fidelity in fulfilling engagements; courtesy, consideration for others and obligingness are reducible to charity; efforts to succeed in life are reducible to fulfilling one's duty to family or employer, etc. There is no action, however morally colorless in itself, which cannot thus be brought under the heading of some natural virtue; no natural virtue which cannot become religious; no religious virtue, which cannot be made supernatural, given that a

man has the habit of regarding life from the religious and the supernatural point of view—or, in other words, as an expression of duty and service to God, of loyalty to the example of Christ, and as an endeavor to fulfill the ends for which man has been placed upon earth.

Viewed in this way, even those human qualities which are more commonly regarded in the light of vices can also be utilized. For instance, a pride which disdains all meanness, and which cherishes a faultless reputation, is not the vice of that name, but is the expression of a proper self-respect. Self-confidence which gives strength and determination not to be overcome by difficulties and temptations is not vicious presumption, but a reasonable trust in the powers which God has given us. An ambition to make the best of one's opportunities as stepping-stones towards success, in all things both temporal and spiritual, is not a vice but a virtue—and so of the rest. The work of self-development, both natural as well as supernatural, is an arduous task no matter how we view it, and we cannot afford to neglect any of the factors which may contribute to that result. As we must not in pursuit of the natural neglect the supernatural, so in the pursuit of the supernatural we must not neglect the natural. But on the contrary, making use of each in its own proper sphere, we must collect all our forces and combine them into one, to carry us on towards that ideal with which we have been graced.

CHAPTER V

THE ALL-ROUND IDEAL

THERE is no greater calumny possible than to charge Christian education with being narrow in its scope, or calculated to cramp the faculties or stultify the mind, or to discourage a healthy, manly self-reliance and initiative. I do not mean to deny that some Christian educationalists may be dominated by narrow views and crippling methods; and where these exist, the credit of good intentions does not prevent us from passing a severe censure against them, and repudiating them as grievously mistaken. The stress laid on faith, piety and whatever comes under the head of religiousness, indicates the vital importance attached to this department; but it does not in any way denote a contempt or neglect of all-round development. Subordinating the natural to the supernatural, or the temporal to the eternal, does not mean *sacrificing* the one to the other, for according to our principles it is the whole man, and not some particular part of him, which is the proper and adequate subject of our training.

Having, therefore, embodied in our ideal everything that is implied by being a perfect Christian and a perfect gentleman, we have now to add every other kind of excellence of a natural kind which is not necessarily included under these terms.

CLEVERNESS *vs.* GOODNESS

I refer to the various physical, mental and practical qualities which go to the make-up of an accomplished all-round man. Lawrence the gardener did not shine in these respects. In the use of his body he possessed neither agility nor elegance, nor any great manual dexterity. He could just read and write, perhaps, but little more. His geography was bounded by Clitheroe, Whalley and Longridge ten miles away, his history by the last fifty years of the college and the village close by. He spoke a broad Lancashire dialect innocent of grammar and no doubt the staple commodity of his conversation was restricted to local gossip and the planting of greens. He had no idea what the sea was like, and possibly had never been in a train—and yet in their essential fullness the Christian and the gentleman were there.

Similarly with the more educated classes. It is in the power of every one to be a Christian and a gentleman, for these two qualities depend solely on a proper disposition of soul ultimately reducible to the free exercise of the will. On the other hand, physical, mental and practical talents rest for the most part on causes which are not under our control—that is to say, primarily on the initial stock-in-trade of abilities with which nature has endowed the individual; and secondarily on the capacity of these initial capabilities to develop under the influence of training.

Hence arises a difference in dealing with these elements of our all-around ideal. If, as we have seen, the essential qualities of "Christian" and "gentleman"

are equally within the capacity of all, it follows that our ambition in these two departments can be uniformly applied. And if, as we have seen, physical, mental and practical talents are dependent on the varying capacities of each individual subject, it follows that our treatment in this matter must vary accordingly—so that anything like lumping a group of children together and submitting them mechanically to one and the same curriculum is sure to be wrong. The exigencies of a college system may require it, of course; but while yielding to this necessity, let us at least recognize its perniciousness and try to minimize its disadvantages.

Another thought immediately suggests itself, regarding the subordination of parts. In our system of education, the most important element must be that which has at once the most far-reaching consequences, and also the advantages of being equally attainable by all alike. But we have already seen that being a Christian and being a gentleman are just the two elements which answer to this description, whereas the other three (viz., physical, mental and practical ability) are just those which do not. Hence these three, however carefully attended to, must logically take the second place. The former must be sought absolutely and without exception or reservation; the latter relatively, and with whatever exception or reservation the material under our hand may require.

DEFECTIVE MODERN SYSTEMS.

It is not my intention to take up the ungracious task of railing against existing systems of education

in general or in particular. It is so easy to stand by and criticise while others are trying their best; but as soon as one's back is bent to the task of improvement matters begin to take a totally different shape. Besides, all thoughtful laborers in the field of education are gradually realizing the imperfection of the systems under which they work, and are only too anxious to better them as soon as they can see the way how. Nevertheless there need be no captiousness in pointing out, for the benefit of those who have not so far realized them, certain prevailing faults which, however inevitable, are so radical that they amount to little less than turning the whole order of things upside-down, and putting the head where the tail should be.

By adding to the foregoing analysis of our five elements the principles already laid down—viz., that the great predominating aim of all training is to produce character and the best possible character—we obtain a firm and definite standpoint from which to pass judgment on any system of education which comes before us. In the first place, all secular education *exclusively such* misses out what from the Christian point of view is *the* most essential element of sound training. By excluding religion it puts aside all concern with the relation of man to his Creator, his first beginning and his final end, and therefore the one factor which has the strongest and most influential bearing on life, and consequences which extend beyond it. The exigencies of modern times may sometimes force on us the elimination of this element, on account of the divergencies of religion which meet

together in one and the same school. But where this anomaly exists, let us at least realize and asknowledge it, and do our best in other ways to minimize its effects.

(2) The same applies to mere insistence on form-discipline without any systematic endeavor to inculcate the fundamental principles of morality.

(3) Modern education "as she is spoke" has much to say about physical and intellectual development, but very little indeed about culture, refinement and the formation of character—which in every case is left with the individual teacher, and forms no part of the official curriculum. Thus the chief attention is diverted from the most essential features of training, and those moreover which lie within the capacity of all—and away towards those other features which, however important in their line, still are or ought to be subordinate, and moreover, do not offer chances of success to any but the select few.

(4) The book-work and cram methods which are characteristic of our public systems put a premium on mere sharpness, and give little attention to the equable development of the average or under-average intellect. This means a survival of the fittest in one very narrow groove; and the great majority—possibly the fittest in every other groove—simply go to the wall.

(5) Given the necessary modicum of submission to form-discipline, successes in education are measured solely by certain ordeals called "examinations," in which facility of memory is the chief determinant factor. And since this ordeal in no way represents

the sterling worth of the individual, it would be almost as good as if success in obtaining public appointments were determined by the length of the candidate's nose.

(6) Taking education as it is officially worked, a youth can pass through the course with flying colors on the strength of a certain mental facility in which religiousness, moral conduct, refinement, character and *savoir faire* count for nothing, and may be present or absent altogether without in any way affecting the published results.

Thank Goodness, behind this official programme there always lies the personality of the individual teacher, through whom a great deal of training in the proper sense of the word may be achieved. But this is all *praeter rem* if not *contra rem*—outside the official system if not in spite of it. The most pessimistic imagination could hardly frame a more dismal picture.

It will, however, be well to guard against misapprehension, as if it were our intention to depreciate the importance of physical, mental and practical ability, and the place it ought to occupy in our curriculum. In the words of Scripture, what we say is: "This should be done, but the other should not have been left undone." Devote the full measure of your energy to these things, for it is your duty; but do not subordinate the lesser to the greater, still less leave the greater out. That would be like building a cathedral without its sanctuary, or trying to describe Waterloo with Napoleon, Wellington and Blucher left out.

THE NATURAL AIDS THE SUPERNATURAL.

As a corrective for that frame of mind which, out of zeal for eternal things, would seem to belittle temporal things, we may close the portion of our subject by pointing out once more how the supernatural depends on the natural and the eternal on the temporal. A man, I admit, can be the very paragon of excellence in physical, mental and practical culture; nay, he can possess the strongest and most fully developed character, and yet may be as proud as Lucifer and as wicked as Nero The reason is, as remarked before, that there is no necessary interdependence or relation between cleverness and goodness —the former springing from the varying gifts of nature, the latter depending solely on the attitude of the free-will. On the other hand, there are thousands of cases in which the highest moral and religious worth is associated with the lowest ability in every department. Hence a certain amount of experience in meeting with these two contrasted types—the talented villain and the untalented saint—sometimes suggests the notion that somehow or other the chances of salvation are with the stupid and the ignorant, and against the clever and the learned. However this idea may work out in practice, at any rate we cannot admit its truth in principle. It will therefore be useful to insist in the counter-truth that, given a modicum of good dispositions, the development of the natural faculties ought to be, and is, a great aid to the development of our proper spiritual ideal. Let us see how this is so:—

(1) *In the physical order.*—I would not go so far as to say that the eternal salvation or damnation of any man is determined by the state of his liver; but I have come across quite a number of cases in which bad health has been followed by a general, moral and religious decline, with a manifest connection between the two. It seems as if a certain amount of physical well-being is necessary, *de facto* at least, to the proper and healthy workings of the soul; and when a man loses a sense of facility and pleasure in being good, he gives up the task as if it were too much for him, and tries to get consolation some other way. To heroic souls, a state of sickness and suffering is often one of the greatest means to sanctification, but in the majority of cases it is the reverse—the *mens sana* succumbs to the *corpus insanum.* Hence a sound physical development can, and ought to be looked upon as an important aid to spirituality, and a valuable though indirect means to the attainment of the highest results we aim at in our training.

(2) *In the practical order.*—In how many cases does the success of a man's life depend upon practical ability—for instance, dexterity of eye or hand—and especially on the *savoir faire* with which he conducts his business? In how many cases does not failure through want of such abilities lead first to despondency, then to loss of self-respect, then to loss of principles, and finally to loss of morality and religion? Here, again, human nature requires a certain amount of success in this life in order to keep up to the mark for the next. Hence the indirect spiritual value of practical ability,

and the importance of our efforts to contribute to the success in life of those who fall under our hand.

(3) *In the mental order.*—Although it can and must be admitted that many of the moral evils in the world come from downright malice, still the least touch of optimism forces us to believe that a much greater proportion of them comes wholly or in parts from mere wrong-headedness—or in other words, from errors of judgment. Surely, we say, people would often do better if they only saw things aright. Half the heresies and schisms in Church history, half the divisions in politics, half the dissensions in family life, half the crooked courses in individual conduct, may without exaggeration be put down to this cause. Now it is a platitude of philosophy that wrongness of judgment springs from inaccuracy of ideas, spring in turn from inaccuracy of observation; and that the radical remedy for inaccuracy of observation is to teach the young to see things as they are, and to remember them when seen, without any admixture of the imagination. Hence the importance, even from a spiritual point of view, of developing the mental faculties on right lines—so that when habituated to work accurately in other departments of life, they may also work accurately in the religious and moral department, and thus give the good dispositions of the will a fair chance.

By this time we may consider the answer to our first question complete. For we know, at least in outline, what we have to aim at in training the young.

CHAPTER VI

THE BABY, THE CHILD AND THE BOY

Our first question was:—"What sort of result do we want our training to produce; or in other words, what sort of men do we wish our children to become?" And the answer is as follows:—We want our children to become excellent Christians, excellent gentlemen, and excellent all-round men. And since the basis on which all these qualities must rest in order to come to their proper effect is 'character'; and again, since character means life dominated by principles, it follows that the great business of our training is, first, to lay before the child the best and noblest possible ideal such as we have already described; secondly, to get that ideal stamped into his mind in the concrete form of sound principles; and thirdly, to establish so firmly in him the habit of acting according to those principles that they will last for the rest of his life.

Such is our aim, and such the programme for its realization. And now we turn to our children themselves, and examine what sort of beings they are—or, according to our second question: What are the materials out of which we have to produce this result? Our third question (viz.: How are we to handle our material so as to bring the result about?) will be partly answered in the very act of handling the second.

What strikes us in the first place is the immense difference between the *terminus a quo* and the *terminus ad quem* of our training process—or in simpler language, between the baby we have to begin with and the man we have to end with. The baby comes before us as a creature of instinct and impulse, scarcely differing in its vital manifestations from the pup, the kitten, or the lamb. If intellect and rational will exist in the little thing, they are in an almost latent condition—so latent as to be unusable in the process of training. Out of this creature we have to make a man; and the essential notion of a man is that intellect and will should dominate his life, while instinct and impulse, though by no means repressed, are subordinated to these higher powers as a horse is subordinated to its rider. How is this remarkable change to be brought about?

FIVE STAGES OF DEVELOPMENT.

The first part of our answer is an extremely simple one. The work of transformation from the baby to the man is one which fortunately goes on by itself. The condition of *babyhood* seems to last about two years. About the end of that time we begin to perceive distinct signs of mental life though not of the highest order. A keen interest in things around is characteristic of this second period, which we call *childhood,* and which may be said to extend from the age of two to seven. At about seven years a third stage is recognizable marked by a power of reflection, self-restraint and responsibility which we call "the use of reason." This use of reason initiates the period

of *boyhood* (corresponding more or less to "school-boyhood"). At about the age of fourteen the breaking of the voice marks the passage from boyhood to youth (the hobbledehoy or awkward stage, as it is usually called); and when after a few years the youth recovers his self-possession (say by the age of 18 to 20) we begin to call him a man.

The important point to realize is that all his development will happen by the process of nature, no matter whether we put the finger of training into the pie or not. Our business, therefore, is not to bring it about that these stages of development shall take place, nor yet to determine their rate of progress. For nature has arranged all according to its own proper measure, and resents, and even takes revenge on any interference which the officious trainer is foolish enough to make. Forced attempts to hasten the process will result in unhealthy precocity, lifelong debility or premature death; while undue retardation will issue either in imbecility or lawless revolt. Our business is not, therefore, to exercise mastery over the developments of nature, but to watch them and, when they occur, to encourage them and to direct them in the gentlest manner possible, by way of attraction from the front, and not by way of pressure from behind—or in other words, to give natural development the best chance which circumstances allow. Our attitude, in short, must not be that of a master, but of a servant, ministering patiently to nature in order that we may draw sweetly from it what we want

But even a servant needs an intelligent grasp of the situation and an intelligent method, if his work is to be done well. The question, therefore, resolves itself into this: In what way are we to serve nature in its different stages, in order to bring out the desired result? In the first place, everybody will recognize that the treatments proper for a baby and for a man are essentially different in kind. The training of an infant differs in little or nothing from the training of a dog. There are certain things which we want the animal to do, and certain other things which we want it *not* to do. When it does the one, we reward it with a lump of sugar, and when it does the other we apply the whip. By a simple association of ideas the animal finds out by degrees that certain acts are bound up with painful, and certain other acts with pleasant consequences; and as this association is gradually stamped into the brain, it becomes an incentive (attractive or deterrent) to the doing or not doing of the deeds in question. The same treatment must be meted out to the infant, regarded simply as such. With a man, on the contrary, our appeal is always to reason, intelligence, knowledge, conscience, the sense of free will and the power of self-control. And if in his case coercion is resorted to, this is not supposed to be merely an appeal to instinct and impulse but an enforcement of reason, and a means of bringing the man to a better and more rational frame of mind.

Now these two methods, being essentially different in kind, are easily understood. We know how to deal with the baby and how to deal with the man; but how are we to handle the intermediate stages between the

baby and the man? In a rough and ready way it is clear that our treatment of the child will approximate more towards the baby-treatment, and that our handling of the boy will approximate more towards the man-treatment. But this answer is too vague. If the question is to be met scientifically, we must begin with the fact that all training is a training of faculties or powers and will materially vary according to the different faculties and powers which fall under training. Our business therefore is, first, to have before us a clear enumeration of the various faculties and powers which belong to a human being; and secondly, to ascertain which of these faculties and powers are the proper subject matter of training in the various stages of babyhood, childhood and boyhood.

THREE ORDERS OF FACULTIES

According to our philosophy, man consists of body and soul; and the body is conjoined to the soul in such a way as to act as its functional instrument—not a separate instrument like a saw or a pickaxe, but a *conjoined* instrument, animated by the soul which pervades the body in all its parts. The soul is one, but possesses three kinds of powers, which we call vegetative, sensitive and rational, and which must be treated apart:—

(1) The "vegetative" powers are those of assimilation, secretion and excretion, and (as a consequence) bodily growth. Eating, sleeping and movement also belong to this category. They work by themselves, as it were mechanically—just as in the plants—and without the necessity of mind to direct them. This

is the department of the *physical*, and the basis of health and strength. The peculiarity of these faculties is that they come into existence in their complete activity from the very first moment, and are not, strictly speaking, proper material for training. The most we can do is to exercise external supervision so as to secure the best conditions for their healthy working. When we speak of the baby-stage of human existence, we mean the period during which these faculties alone are in evidence—or perhaps more correctly, where the other and higher faculties are too immature for training, and so practically negligible. The result is, our treatment of a baby, purely such, differs in no way from our treatment of a geranium, which we plant and water and manure, and submit to sunshine and shade, and which we prune and transplant according to certain rules learned from experience—our object being to produce the healthiest, strongest and most beautiful geranium which our resources and the capabilities of the plant allow. Our earliest attentions to the infant are much of the same nature. We must see him fed at the proper time and with the proper kind and amount of food, watch over the regularity of his natural functions, provide for the proper amount of fresh air and exercise, watch for symptoms of sickness and treat them accordingly, and thus give the infant the best possible chance of growing up a sound, healthy and vigorous man.

(2) The next kind of faculties are the "sensitive." They comprise first of all the five functions of seeing, hearing, touch, taste and smell—and including, of course, that kind of mental activity which underlies

them. These faculties are not found in plants, but we share them in common with the animals. As soon as sense comes in, knowledge comes in also—knowledge, not of the higher or rational kind, but of the lower or sensitive kind. It consists in the perception of internal feelings and of external things. But the sensitive faculties include not only those of perception, but also those of feeling—of like and dislike, desire and pursuit of what is agreeable, disgust and fear and avoidance of what is disagreeable—a kind of volition, though not yet of the highest or rational kind.

These sense functions are the characteristic of the period called childhood, and provide the first material for training. This does not mean that they come into existence with a jerk; for even in the earliest baby-stage they are present in some degree, thus theoretically affording scope for training. But in practice it is recognized as not only unwise, but also ineffectual, to begin systematic training during the first few months, or even the first year or two. The idea should, however, be realized, so that it can be put into effect as soon as the proper time comes.

(3) Last come the "rational" faculties, which consist of intellect and will. These are distinctively and exclusively human, and constitute a human being precisely as such. Intellectually, reason advances beyond sense-perception by viewing single objects under the form of general or abstract ideas, as well as grasping such notions as cause, relation, etc. It also includes the power of using facts as a ground for inferences, or reasoning to other ideas. Ethically, reason consists in the faculty of will—of like and

dislike, of desire and repugnance, resembling those of the "sensitive will," but working upon ideas intellectually grasped and therefore in a higher plane. It also includes reflection on conflicting motives for action, their moral value, and freedom of choice between them. As soon as the rational faculties have reached a degree of development which is sufficient for their habitual use, the age of childhood is past and the period of boyhood has begun. We usually speak of the change as "the attainment of the use of reason." This "attainment of the use of reason," however, means rather the attainment of responsibility. This responsibility comprises three elements: —(1) consciousness of free choice; (2) consciousness of right or wrong choice; and (3) consciousness of the duty of right choice—or in other words, the ethical need as well as the power of self-control.

In this matter, our rough and ready way of speaking of the attainment of reason is apt to lead us astray. We think of it as something which comes at a certain time and by a rather sudden change; whereas it has really been coming on during the whole of childhood, although attaining a full workable condition only by the age of seven. Hence the training of the rational faculties ought to begin with the first indications, without waiting for the fuller development which is characteristic of the boy-stage. From neglect of this truth arises the fault of treating the child as a child too long. By this tardiness we lose the very best opportunities of training; and when at last we realize that the child has become a boy, our discovery is often too late. The rational life has been

allowed to develop unguided and all awry, and no end of trouble is found in trying to destroy mental habits which with proper vigilance should never have been allowed to take root.

THREE METHODS OF TREATMENT

We are now in a position to answer definitely the question regarding modifications of method. Suppose that the different stages came suddenly, and were strictly marked off from each other. We should then have three periods to deal with in turn, and three corresponding methods:—

(1) In the baby-stage, when the vegetative faculties alone are in operation, we should treat the infant as we should treat a plant.

(2) In the child-stage, when the sensitive faculties come into operation, we should treat the child as we should treat an animal.

(3) In the boy-stage, when the rational faculties are in evidence, we should treat the boy as an imperfectly developed man—but still as a man, because he possesses all the essentials which go to the making of man.

But as a matter of fact, nature does not work in this water-tight compartment way. In the baby-stage, when the vegetable faculties are in full swing, the animal powers are pressing through the first stages of development; and so the child-treatment must in some suitable way be combined with the baby-treatment. In the child-stage, when the animal activities are in full-swing, the rational faculties are also undergoing the first stages of development; and therefore the

child-policy has to be combined with the boy-policy. Lastly, in the boy-stage, when the rational faculties are supposed to dominate the character, much of the child will still survive; so that something of the child-treatment must still be retained in combination with the man-treatment.

Therefore when we speak of the modified treatment for the different stages, what we mean is that all three methods must be in readiness for application as the case may require, and the choice between them will depend on the disposition of the subject under treatment. First comes the baby-treatment pure and simple. As soon as the child-stage begins to manifest itself, the child-method must be applied tentatively, and continued if successful, or dropped again for the time if unsuccessful. As soon as the baby-stage is passed and the child-method has come into full vogue, some tentative appeal should also be made to the expanding reason. In other words, we should, as far as circumstances allow, offer to the child some chance of being managed by the standards proper to the man. If, through imperfect development, this higher method fails—as will frequently be the case,—we must recognize the failure, and at once fall back on the methods proper to the child. Next time we try the experiment again with hope of better results. Gradually the appeal to incipient reason will meet with its proper response; and resort to child-methods will become rarer, and finally drop out altogether.

Although this will seem pretty obvious to all observant trainers of the young, it is often, we fear, insufficiently realized in practice. While on the one

hand those in authority are always expecting and urging their children "to be men," they are rather inclined to resent it if the children take their word to heart, and display anything like a marked disposition to carry out their advice. Over and over again we have seen the incipient efforts of the child to expand into the man, checked and discouraged by a loss of patience, and a taunt such as "You are only a child yet." This attitude is, of course, often excusable because the "manliness" usually developed in the child is at first rather crude, and takes the form of being self-willed, independent and unmanageable—and it would never do to allow this, in a stage of existence in which the reason, and especially the habits, are not yet sufficiently formed. When this critical situation arises, two mistakes are possible. The one is to give up the child as incorrigible; to let him have his own way, and develop his manhood at the expense of his character. The other is to crush out the rising aspiration, to discourage all autonomy, and to rule the growing youngster by child-methods as long and as much as possible. It is a delicate matter, and one in which only observation and tact can be our guide. Let it be taken for granted that mistakes will continually be made. But still, so far as general principles will help, so far will our present line of suggestion be useful.

The important point, therefore, is to recognize that, since the child-stage is something merely temporary and transient, the child-method of treatment ought also to be temporary and transient, and something to be got rid of as soon as possible. Understand,

however, there must be no running into opposite extremes—no forcing of nature. It would be just as ridiculous to take a child for a man as it would be to take a pup for a man. No, the child must be frankly treated as a child so long as he is one; but by realizing that the child-state is temporary and transient, parents will be on their guard against the prevailing mistake, as we consider it, of keeping up the child-treatment as long as possible, and thus impeding the process of development, instead of being on the *qui vive* to discard it as soon as the development allows.

CHAPTER VII

WATCHING THE DEVELOPMENT.

It is clear from what we have just seen that there are more things in the training of the young than are dreamt of in the philosophy of ordinary common sense. It may be admitted at once that a philosopher, applying his theories without the aid of common sense, would make a frightful mess of his task, and probably spoil the child altogether. At the same time the soundest common sense, when analyzed, consists simply in perceiving the facts of the case and acting in accordance with them. And sound philosophy means exactly the same thing, only expressed in a more recondite form.

Practically, therefore, half the business of training is to know what there is to train. This we have already seen in outline by our enumeration of the vegetative, sensitive and rational faculties, and the physical, emotional, intellectual and moral spheres in which they function. But practically, since these various faculties (except the vegetative) have each to undergo a process of gradual expansion; and since this expansion does not begin simultaneously but in succession—the next needful thing is to know the times of their manifestatoin—*i. e.*, to recognize them as they first present themselves to us as objects for training. Common experience tells us in general when to expect each stage of development, so that the

vigilance of parents is limited simply to watching for their appearance in the individual child; applying (where necessary) occasional tests to ascertain whether the faculty in question has begun to operate effectively or not. The present section will therefore be devoted to showing how the different stages of development can be recognized, the means by which progress can be furthered, and finally the points on which the faculties must be guided and trained.

TRAINING OF OBSERVATION.

The signs of passing from babyhood pure and simple to childhood are, first simple observation; secondly, discriminate observation; and thirdly, the retention of past observations in the memory. All these are in the child-stage to be regarded as functions of the sensitive faculties alone. Observation *of a kind* there is almost from the very first. This is, however, in its earlier stages such as follows merely from the possession of a pair of eyes. Discriminate observation begins where the child shows pleasure or displeasure, fondness or fear regarding certain objects. Witness for instance how the child is delighted with bright colors and displeased with dull or sombre ones; how it will shrink from strangers, or nestle in the arms of familiar ones with a manifest sense of security and satisfaction. Memory begins to reveal itself as soon as the child shows a recognition of objects seen before, etc.* These three processes of

* It should here be observed that the acquisition of language (beyond mere babbling sounds) may be taken as an infallible sign of awakening intellect, for the simple reason that language is an expression of ideas and cannot be acquired till there exist in the mind ideas to express.

the sensitive faculties can be furthered and trained at once by a simple expedient. According to philosophy, a faculty is moved by the presence of its proper object; and so far as objects present *themselves*, so far will nature see to the observation of them. But it is not enough that the object shall be there; it is also necessary that the mind shall be focussed, be concentrated on it. Duration of mental focus is half the making of accurate observation. And therefore the first foundations of mental concentration can be laid in the earliest years by a judicious calling of the child's attention fixed on that object for a time—especially if the child shows a disposition to wander from one thing to another with a flightiness which misses its meaning.

Again, *firmness* of mental focus is one of the essential conditions for discriminate observation. In this matter, too, nature usually looks after itself to a great extent. But it can be considerably helped by training. and this in two ways—first by teaching the child to notice the *likenesses* and the *differences* of things; and secondly, and above all, by correcting inaccuracies in observation whenever they appear. This latter process must not be achieved by telling but by showing. Take the object, and make the child find out for itself its own mistakes—helping by suggestion where necessary, but not doing for the child the work which it ought to do for itself For observation is one of those things which cannot be done by deputy. Each one must practice the art for himself.

The "Kindergarten Method" now so widely adopted in the early classes of our schools. is (so far as we

understand it) simply an outcome of these principles —*viz.*, of showing instead of telling; of presenting the object for *discriminate* observation; of making the child discover the likenesses and differences of things, and of impelling it, by judicious suggestion, to correct its own mistakes. All this comes much later, when the child is already advancing well towards the boy-stage. But the method which is then begun systematically, and carried out for so many hours a day, can, if the parents are wide-awake, be anticipated incidentally at a much earlier stage in the home circle. Only—as we say for the third time, and shall probably say for the fortieth before we have finished with the subject—do not force or overreach nature. Both extremes must be avoided. If much is lost by allowing the child's newly awakening faculties of observation to pass for a considerable time without any training at all, much greater harm may be done by taking too pedagogic an attitude — or in other words, by subjecting the child to a strenuous mental drill before its brain is sufficiently formed to bear enforced concentration. What is done in the earliest stages must be done tentatively, incidentally and lightly—just enough to give the right turn from the very first, and to prevent habits of carelessness and inaccuracy from taking their first roots in the virgin soil.

TRAINING OF IMPULSE

But another point of philosophy must here be touched upon; namely, that in each of the departments (the vegetative, the sensitive, and the rational) the faculties must be divided into two kinds which,

according to the point of view taken, can be called sometimes active and passive, sometimes receptive and projective, and sometimes static and dynamic respectively. In the vegetative department the distinction is perhaps somewhat obscure and need not be dwelt upon here. But in the other two it is quite clear. According to scholastic terminology, both the sensitive and the rational powers are divided into the "apprehensive and concupiscible" or in modern non-scholastic terminology "cognitive and conative" (*conor*, I attempt, or make an effort). To students of philosophy these various terms will be helpful, but to the untechnical it is simpler to divide the sensitive functions into "perception and impulse," and the rational functions into "thought and will"—the former of each pair terminating in *knowledge*, and the latter in *action*.

We have already, in dealing with childhood or the sensitive period, touched upon the respective faculty of observation, or the acquisition of fact-knowledge. It is now time to turn to the other half of the subject, *viz.*, the projective faculty of impulse or sense-volition, which is based on the sensations of pleasure and pain, and issues in desires and shrinkings, likes and dislikes for different objects observed or experienced. These impulses are so spontaneous that they hardly admit of positive training in the earlier years; but they do at least offer material for practicing the beginnings of self-control. The child has to learn at once that there are some things which must be done, and, other things which must not be done, quite irrespective of likes and dislikes—as to take food and

medicine, or to stay in the room or in the cot, not to pull the furniture about or play with the fire-irons, etc. But since the child cannot as yet exercise self-control on motives of reason, the whole matter resolves itself into this: "Do what you are told, or you must be whipped." Though there is a certain limit to physical force, it is essential to good training that, even in the early stage, the child should never score over its parents by getting its own way. One single instance of successful obstinacy threatens to ruin the whole work and the whole character—so significant are the first beginnings of revolt. But care should be taken that the thing insisted on is reasonable, moderate and in some way necessary; and that the burden of submission should not be made too irksome and difficult, or the tests too frequent. And though the method of training used in the child-stage differs little or nothing from that adopted in the training of a dog, still parents should always bear in mind that this policy is temporary and transient. With the coming age of reason always in view, they should habitually look forward in that direction, and begin their appeal to the higher faculties as soon as these reveal themselves in the slightest degree.

THE RATIONAL MIND

We can now turn to the highest, *viz.*, the rational powers of intellect and free will. The powers of the intellect are philosophically defined as apprehension, judgment and reasoning; but it must not be forgotten that the object from which these processes must start is sense-knowledge already acquired by the faculties

of sense. In the first kind of act (simple apprehension) the sense perception and the intellectual perception are simultaneous. The only difference is that, whereas sense perceives the object as a single thing, the intellect takes that same thing as a sort of type-object, and classifies it with others of the same kind already observed or still to be observed. This process involves acts of analysis, synthesis and comparison. Analysis means mentally dividing up the whole object into its component parts; or making several objects out of one complex object. Synthesis means putting parts together into a whole, or making one collective object out of several objects. Comparison, which can both precede and follow analysis and synthesis, means a perception of the likenesses and differences of things. Judgment is a sort of affirmation or "mental nod" or a *nailing down* in the mind, so to speak, of the knowledge which has been acquired. Reasoning means taking two or more judgments and, by "putting two and two together," as the saying is, drawing an inference therefrom thus advancing from the knowledge of what is perceived to the knowledge of something else not perceived

Fortunately all these mental acts are so natural and spontaneous as to be performed excellently well without having to philosophize about them. The philosophy is useful, however, because it gives definiteness to the aim of the trainer by pointing out the mental processes which have to be encouraged and guided. As in the sense department, so in the intellectual, much can be done to arouse and direct the attention of the child to suitable objects, to make it look at

their parts in detail (analysis), to notice their likenesses and differences; to pass simple judgments on them, and even to induce something like reasoning about them. And when under this encouragement the child begins really *to think*, the next important point is to make sure that its thinking, so far as it goes, is accurate and not slipshod and wrong. This should be done, not by the way of point-blank contradiction, but by inducing the child to think again, and by helping it to find out its own mistakes. In the child-stage this should be done sweetly, moderately and incidentally. All systematic efforts at mental training must be left for the riper age of boyhood and of school.

THE RATIONAL WILL

But of far more importance at this stage is the training of the will. It is of the nature of the will to follow the understanding; that is to say, an object must be known before it can be willed. Hence the foundation for all will-training lies first in the department of intellect or knowledge. We have already summed up the essense of the ethical "use of reason" under these three heads:—consciousness of free choice, of right and wrong choice, and of the duty of right choice. The sense of choice develops, we believe, as soon as the child finds itself confronted with the material for choice; that is to say, as soon as it comes across two things both of which it would like to have, but of which it must perforce take the one and leave the other. The development of this faculty of choice can be judiciously helped by the following simple expe-

dient:—Do not be too autocratic with your child. If it is the question of an apple or an orange, do not settle which it shall have, but put the alternative before the child. Its motive of choice will be an incoherent one, dictated at first by mere beauty of color. But that does not matter. If hesitation is shown encourage it just long enough to let the child realize that it can make up its mind, but not long enough for vacillation. Put gentle pressure on to force the child to a prompt decision; otherwise mischief will follow. We sometimes come across men who simply cannot make up their minds about anything. Like the proverbial donkey between two haystacks, they turn this way and that, and shrink from selecting the one object because it means giving up the other; making up their mind in a half-hearted way, and then reversing their decision—until someone else has to come in and settle the matter for them. And then when it is all over, they feel more unhappy thinking over the loss of what they have rejected than they feel happy over the gain of what they have chosen. Due deliberation consists in weighing the alternatives, and the reasons at the back of each, *in proportion to the importance of the issue at stake*; but misproportioned deliberation is deplorable and ridiculous. Firmness and promptness in making up one's mind is one of the proper equipments of a well-formed character,—as also is the habit of sticking to the choice once made. If you wish your child to acquire this characteristic of manliness, begin early in the way described:—where the permission of choice is feasible allow it; insist on the choice being made promptly; when choice has been

once made, remove the object rejected; and finally repress all harking back.

This healthy discipline should be tried as soon as there is the least likelihood of the child's mind being capable of choice at all, and it should be persevered in througout—avoiding arbitrary decisions for the child wherever the child can safely be allowed to choose for itself; but on the other hand insisting on cheerful acceptance of your decision wherever choice in not advisable. Making up the mind on the ground of mere impulsive preference will soon develop into the making up of the mind on better reasoned motives as soon as they become known; while the habit of decision thus acquired in indifferent matters will soon find its higher exercise in matters of moral import. This first element of rational life can therefore, as we have seen, be developed to some extent in the child-stage. The faculty of free choice is there, but its earliest exercise is dominated merely by the prevalence of the strongest motive—and that not a reasoned motive, but an impulse proper to the sensitive life. It is only when we pass to the second point (the sense of right and wrong choice) that the moral aspect of volition comes into view, and this is of such importance that we must relegate its treatment to the following section.

CHAPTER VIII

INCIPIENT MANHOOD

Incipient manhood begins, as we have seen, at the transition from the child to the boy; and this transition is indicated by the first practicable consciousness of free-will. This consciousness introduces for the first time a sort of autonomy which is distinctly human, and which issues in the *actus humanus* or human act properly so-called—*viz.*, action deliberately performed under a knowledge of its import—*actus deliberatus cum cognitione finis.*

The simple realization of one's own free-will does not, however, in itself constitute moral responsibility. It merely makes men masters of their own actions, but leaves the field open to unrestricted choice. Hence a further development is necessary to constitute man as a moral being—*viz.*, a consciousness of right and wrong choice, and the duty of making a right choice. We must consider these two stages apart.

Consciousness of right and wrong choice means a discrimination in the quality of acts. This necessarily involves some standard of judgment, and of such standards the human mind can find three—the utilitarian, the ethical and the religious. A word about each of these in turn.

THREE STANDARDS OF CHOICE

(1) *The Utilitarian Standard.*—In its simplest form this standard is identical with that of animal impulse,

where action is dominated by the motives of pleasure and pain, like and dislike—*e.g.*, to eat what tastes nice and not to eat what tastes nasty. Through the medium of association, even the animal mind gradually learns to extend its view from the intrinsic feeling of the action to its consequences, and the judgment formed on this basis may in some cases reverse the more primary verdict—*e.g.*, to eat this, *although disagreeable*, because it does me good; not to eat that, *although agreeable*, because it does me harm. Thirdly, in case of human beings the rational mind can pass further, so as to include consequences which are indirect and remote, *e.g.*, I must not rob because it will bring me to jail; or I should do service to my fellow-men because it secures their good-will and brings me service in return. The principle underlying these decisions is essentially the same, *viz.*, the self-centred comfort, convenience or well-being of the individual agent, looked at as the all-sufficient standard of conduct. From the point of view of pleasure and pain this system is called "hedonism;" from that convenience and inconvenience it is called "utilitarianism." Although both these systems are called "ethical," the ethical element, taken in its true sense, enters into neither of them. Even a third system called "altruistic utilitarianism"—which seeks the greatest happiness of the greatest number—belongs to this first standard so far as benevolence to others is based on the *pleasure* of benevolence or its utility to self; but if the benevolence is real and unselfish, this system rather falls under the standard next to be considered.

(2) *The Ethical Standard.* —This standard rests on the goodness of actions considered objectively—that is to say, actions have a worthiness or unworthiness in themselves, irrespective of the pleasure or pain, advantage or disadvantage to the individual. Here a certain "ideal" of conduct begins to enter in, and with it ethical principle. The standard is derived from the constitution of the human mind, and the appeal is to certain virtues such as justice, propriety or conformity with nature. Some actions are felt to be worthy, some unworthy of a man. Why it should be so does not fall under discussion. The moral sense of mankind is taken as an absolute standard. Somehow or another, all agree that cruelty, injustice, volence, fraud, lying, deception, licentiousness, etc., are "vices," and kindness, justice, honesty, truthfulness, self-restraint, etc., are "virtues." Hence the one line of conduct is wrong, no matter how pleasurable or advantageous, while the other is right, no matter how painful and disadvantageous. Such a standard can and does *de facto* subsist among well-trained and well-disposed men, quite irrespective of religious belief; and it is a question much discussed whether it *can* subsist *de jure* or not. With this discussion we have at present nothing to do. It is enough to have noted the fact that men are capable of maintaining such a standard and of acting upon it without intending thereby to acknowledge the existence of a personal law-giver or the idea of any obligation to him. Our theological explanation is that God has imprinted upon the mind of man a certain instinct, as we may for convenience call it—a certain ethical con-

sciousness of right and wrong which we call "the natural law" and a certain feeling of duty to eschew evil and do good. This instinct is no other than a reflection of the divine mind, and is part of our image and likeness to him. Its impress is so strong that it must perforce dominate the normal human mind quite irrespective of all reflection as to its origin and cause. This standard of choice is generally summed up in the maxim: "virtue for virtue's sake."

(3) *The Religious Standard.*—This third standard is the highest of the three, because, instead of leaving man in isolated autonomy as if he were a self-existent and independent being, it brings him into express relation to his creator, his first beginning and last end —a relation which is properly inseparable from his character as a creature. Naturally it over-rides the first standard of pleasure and expediency just as the second or ethical standard does; but can it be said to over-ride the second? Properly speaking it does not. For the second or ethical standard is the work of God Himself, who has impressed it in our souls. It is in fact a reflection of the divine nature; and as God cannot contradict Himself, it follows that the ethical and the religious standards must coincide. Objectively speaking, therefore, the man who is guided by non-religious ethics and the man who is guided by religious ethics will have the same moral code—the difference being that the first practices virtue for virtue's sake alone, while the other practices virtue for God's sake—the difference being one not of action but of motive.*

* We are not here concerned with the question whether a man of ethical ideas can be ignorant of God, or whether ethical

Of course, when we take supernatural religion into account, there is a certain sense in which the religious standard will over-ride the ethical standard—never so as to turn the ethically wrong into the religiously right, but only in the way of adding new obligations and restrictions unknown to nature. Thus the natural taken by itself knows nothing of the obligation to believe in Christ, to join the Church, to frequent the sacraments, etc. Again, the natural law, *perhaps* allowed two wives, whereas the revealed law allows only one; the natural law imposes no duty of giving help to the destitute, whereas the revealed law makes it an obligation, etc. This only means that God has added to the strictness of our obligations by positive enactments, and not that He has in any way cancelled or contradicted the ethical code stamped on the natural conscience of man.

The superiority of the religious standard over the ethical lies therefore in two points. In the first place, it affords an explanation of the ethical code and its underlying cause, which is a God supremely good in Himself, the standard and norm of all good in creatures, and the law-giver dominating our lives. In the second place it brings us into personal relation with Him, causing us to accept His will as the rule of our action, and to exercise virtue on this account. In other words, ethical conduct practiced in the light of religion is no longer merely the striving after an

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dictates would properly have any force apart from belief in God, or whether the ethical man will in fact practice virtue to the same extent as the religious man. Our sole concern is with the abstract analysis of the three standards taken in themselves.

instinctive ideal, but rises to the higher plane of personal service. For religion means the recognition that God is our creator, lord and master, to whom personal service is due.

This service admits of two grades, that of duty and that of love. In the first grade I obey God simply out of a sense of justice because service is His due; whereas in the second or higher grade I obey God out of love, because I wish to give Him pleasure. Let it be observed, however, that in no case does the higher standard exclude or cancel the lower ones. A certain action may be pleasurable and expedient; it may be virtuous and becoming, and it may at the same time be a duty. All these motives may coexist in the impulsion which leads me so to act. But the highest attitude of mind is this:—"Such an action is my duty, and the fulfillment of my duty is pleasing to God. That is sufficient motive for me to do it, even if all its other recommendations were absent from my mind."

APPLICATION TO THE CHILD

With these general outlines before us, we can now apply them to our subject. The child—one who is simply such—is supposed to have the practical use of no faculties except those of sense-perception and sense-impulse, in which the only springs of action are pleasure and pain, like and dislike. But even in this stage it is our business to induce control—to fix on the things which the child ought to do and those which it ought not to do, and to encourage the one and discourage the other by signs of pleasure and dis-

pleasure, or even by rewards and punishments—without at this stage appealing to reason or explaining the reasons why. By this very process the child will not only learn to make a distinction between the acts which please and those which displease his parents, but will gradually discover his power of checking impulse, and avoiding that which causes displeasure.

This at once gives a first crude notion of choice, and of right and wrong choice. The standard of right and wrong is so far measured by the pleasure and displeasure of the parents; but by degrees a higher ideal must be instilled. And here is the place to emphasize an important point which we can introduce by means of a story. I once knew a college-master of strong personality, who was considered one of the most successful disciplinarians of his time. He was able to do anything with his boys. A word from him was enough to correct faults which others were powerless to cure, and his class was regarded as a model for the rest of the college. By degrees, however, things began to change. His boys were found giving trouble everywhere outside the schoolroom, and seemed to get quite out-of-hand. An appeal was made to their master, who again had only to say one word and the mischief ceased. But it was only to break out again after a time. Finally this insubordination gradually began to be felt even by the master himself within the class. To cut a long tale short, before two years were out the master had lost all hold on his class, and finally had to be sent away in order to prevent a fiasco.

What was the cause of this catastrophe? It lay in one single but radical mistake. "The master's will is the law of this school," was the principle by which he ruled. With his strong character he was able to succeed for a time; but by degrees his personality grew familiar, lost its mystery and so lost its magnetic force. His mistake, however, did not lie in making the fullest use of his personality. It lay in elevating his will into a rule of conduct in place of the objective laws of right and wrong. The boys had learned to submit to their master's will as their whole duty; but they had not learned the principles of obedience in general, nor the notion of duty, nor of respect for authority and law. It was a personal service merely, which lasted just so long as the spell of his character cast its shadow over their souls.

The moral is clear. Incompetent parents are only too apt to be satisfied so long as their children do what they are told. They do not realize that perhaps this seeming obedience is merely submission to a will stronger than their own. These infatuated custodians assert themselves and the child is subdued; and that is all. Nay more, let us suppose the child obeys not merely because he will otherwise be whipped or scolded. Suppose he has got so far as to obey because disobedience displeases and obedience pleases his parents. In this attitude there is simply no morality at all. It is a service of affection, perhaps, but it is not virtue. The most important thing to instill into a child's mind is that obedience is a submission to duty, and not to a human will—that his true rule of conduct is the objective law of right and wrong.

This, it will be objected, means diverting the mind of the child from a concrete personality to an abstract notion, which will less easily appeal to him. We meet this objection by showing that the element of affection or the personal element becomes immediately useful in another way. As submission to will must be elevated into submission to law, so affection towards parents must be used as a stepping-stone to affection towards God. Teach the child as early as possible who God is, how wonderful He is, how good He is, how loveable He is. Then teach him that God is our master, and duty means serving Him as such. Teach him too, how God is our heavenly Father, and that our service of duty must also be a service of love. Then sum up your whole course of instruction in terms more or less like these:—My child, you can do this because otherwise you will be whipped. Better do it because otherwise you will displease your parents. Better still to do it because it is the right thing—because it is your duty to God, and because fidelity to duty is pleasing to Him.

CHAPTER IX

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF HABIT

Having sketched out the various stages of development from the baby to the incipient man, our next step is to consider the means by which that development can best be directed in right lines. Harking back to our first definitions, we repeat that the great object of our efforts in training is to form character, that character means life dominated by principles, and that principles are ethical truths firmly grasped and applied in practice. The firm grasping of these truths and their regular application to conduct means nothing else than their regular formation of habits.

A habit is defined as a stable and permanent facility in performing acts. It is at the outset important to realize that a habit, if it is to have moral worth, does not mean acting mechanically. A locomotive always behaves in the same way as soon as the steam is turned on or off, simply because it is so constructed and cannot help it. Similarly in life, men acquire a way of "acting in a groove," as we call it, without reflection or purpose, and in this respect they differ little from machines. A habit involves a like regularity of action under like circumstances, but if ethical value is looked for it means something more. It means *facility* in the will to say yes or no according to a certain standard of conduct dominating the mind—in other words, a facility in putting principles into practice—the principles being already there.

EARLY INCULCATION OF HABITS

The first question is, how soon can the inculcation of habits begin? The answer is:—Make no delay, but begin at the very first possible moment—taking into account, however, the capacity of the subject at all stages of his existence, and adapting the means and methods accordingly.

In the baby-stage, as we have seen, the training of a human being differs in no way from that of a pup; and all our influence must be exercised physically and from without. If the baby spits its sucking-teat out, put it in again and keep putting it in till the infant takes its food. If it kicks and struggles, or scrambles out of its cot, put it back again, and in the last resort tie it down till it learns to keep quiet, etc., etc. As soon as the child-stage begins, the sense impulses have to be directed by an appeal to the sense perceptions. The child is told to do this or not to do that, and the command is enforced by a show of pleasure or displeasure, reward and punishment, and even where necessary by physicial coercion of a more absolute kind. Much at this stage can be done to teach the child habits of cleanliness, refined and quiet behaviour, accommodation to the wishes of others, etc., and to prevent the formation of contrary habits such as slovenliness, rudeness, rowdiness, inconsiderateness, insolence and the like. Much can also be done to ensure a moderate and pleasant use of the voice, upright and graceful carriage, accuracy and distinctness in speaking, etc., etc. Also the habit of respecting things as well as persons—using books and furniture gently,

keeping toys and pictures neatly and in good condition, instead of recklessly destroying them or letting them lie about in disorder, etc. Pleasures can be linked with corresponding duties; for example, if a romp is allowed, things must be put straight afterwards; if a holiday is given to-day, lessons must be all the better done to-morrow, etc. Then, there are the restraints of time and place—to get up and go to bed and to take meals at the right time, to keep in the nursery and not wander into the parlor without leave, to come indoors or to go out according to regulation, to leave the drawing-room without resistance when told. Finally, variou forms of self-restraint, such as not to cry without reason, and then in moderation and only for a short time; not to shout at close quarters, or to make a disproportionate noise in the house, etc.

The number of possible details may look overwhelming, but in practice they all reduce themselves to a certain orderly discipline in the household—not too severe or farreaching, not too difficult or burdensome —and a quiet vigilance to see that the child conforms to it—inducing the child as far as possible to observe the code by itself without having to be told every time; or in other words, dispensing with the leading strings as far as possible. The aim is to secure gradually the largest amount of self-management which the character of the child allows, and only supplementing it by external aids as far as the child fails to manage for itself.

For it cannot be realized too keenly, even in the earliest stages, that all real training is self-training; and that habits enforced from without are worthless,

except so far as they are responded to by a process of self-formation within. Under external pressure the child will do this and abstain from that, not by any wish of its own, but merely because it is pushed in one direction or pulled in another, or repressed or tied up as it were by the ligaments of a command—its mental attitude being merely passive.

On the contrary, the attitude of co-operation from within means internal activity. The child is not merely willing to do what it is told, but takes up in a certain way the point of view of the parents, assimilates the orders given, fixes them in his mind as rules for other occasions also, and thus creates for himself a code of conduct which he will naturally follow when left to himself. Only by this internal process of self-training can be acquired that regular and permanent facility of acting in a certain way which constitutes a habit.

Manifestly, then, the formation of habits in this ethical sense of the word is only possible in so far as the reason is awakened and ready to be appealed to. The *full* attainment of reason is generally supposed to take place at the age of seven more or less, but we have already stated that it is really working behind the scenes much earlier, at least as soon as the baby passes into the child—say at the age of two. This is proved to demonstration by the acquisition of language. The first attempts to articulate sound may be merely parrot-like—the outcome of the instinct of imitation; but as soon as the child begins to use words with the slightest intention of meaning something by them, it is manifest that reason is behind; for no faculty lower than intellect is capable of such a mental process.

Hence the formation of habits must not be put off, but must be begun at least as soon as the child begins to speak—and in fact this will be precisely the sign *when* to begin. The child will not at first understand anything about the reasons for a given command, but he will at least grasp the command as an idea, and will be able to make it his own.

ASSOCIATION OF IDEAS

But while laying stress on the ethical aspect of habits, we must not lose sight of their physical basis. It is important to realize the part which the physical plays in human life, even in acts whose performance necessarily postulates intellect and will. This appears most clearly in those actions which we perform without seeming to think about them in the least—for example, walking, talking and eating. But it goes much further than this. A certain musician, who was in the habit of elaborate extemporizing on the organ, once told me that he always played best while thinking of something else. His power of extemporizing was the outcome of years not only of manual practice but also of scientific study of harmony, counterpoint, figured bass, etc. And yet so accustomed had his fingers become to handling the keys according to this knowledge, that he was able to produce the fullest and most subtle and complicated structures both of harmony and melody without reflecting once on what he was doing—in fact, he always made more mistakes when attending than when not attending.

The explanation of this and kindred phenomena is to be sought in the constitution of the nerves and

brain, and includes a psychological and physiological fatcor. The psychological factor lies in what is called "association of ideas" or of images. The various impressions of the mind do not lie isolated one beside another. They are linked with each other by a most complicated set of relations; so that as soon as one of them rises to the surface of consciousness, it tends to draw up a certain other idea with which it is in some way connected; and this second will bring up a third, and the third a fourth, and so on. How often in a reverie do we find our thoughts passing from one thing to another with a smooth gliding sequence although there is no apparent connection and no internal sequence in the series. Nevertheless the connection is there, though sometimes of the most casual kind. My watch reminds me of Dr. Porter because it once belonged to him; Dr. Porter reminds me of Farm Street confessional because it was there I first met him; Farm Street confessional reminds me of Stockwell where I lived at the time; Stockwell reminds me of a certain artist friend who lived near; this artist friend reminds me of St. Bartholomew's Church, Smithfield, because he it was who first took me there; St. Bartholomew's, Smithfield, reminds me of the Great Fire of London because close by was the spot where it ceased to burn; the Fire of London reminds me of Defoe who wrote a graphic account of it; Defoe reminds me of Robinson Crusoe of which he was the author; Robinson Crusoe reminds me of the nursery where I first read it, the nursery reminds me of my old nurse, my old nurse reminds me of the cottage where she lived, that cottage reminds me of something else—

and so on, and so on. Moreover, when once a certain sequence of associations like this has been indulged in, it has always a tendency to repeat itself whenever the mind happens to fall upon any of its component elements.

THE USE OF ASSOCIATION

The bearing of "association" on the formation of habits is obvious. When a cat learns not to drink milk on the shelf through being whipped, it is simply the previous connection of two ideas which produces the cure. As soon as the little creature sees the milk on the shelf and feels an impulse to drink it, up comes the associated reminiscence of whipping to follow. If the apprehension of the pain is more vivid than the impulse towards the pleasure, it will leave the milk alone. The approval and disapproval, the punishments and rewards dealt out to a child have preicsely the same effect. As the mind develops, these associations of ideas acquire a higher meaning. In how many cases is a child cured of stealing (or some other vice) for the whole of his life because of a stupendous whipping he once got when young. In after years he knows perfectly well that the days of whipping are over; but the severity with which the sin was visited in the past has stamped on his mind such an impression of its heinousness that he can never forget it. In consequence, a temptation to steal and a determination not to steal have come to be linked together in his mind; and the connection has become so habitual by repetition that now the idea of stealing, when it occurs, does not amount to a temptation at all.

This instance illustrates the value of associating two ideas together when the result of the combination is good; for instance, where the idea of a bad action is linked with some other idea calculated to act as a deterrent. And of course the same advantage will accrue when the idea of a good act is linked to another which will serve as an encouragement to perform it. But besides the advantage of linking ideas together, there is also conversely an advantage in dissociating them. Thus, for example, the idea of a bad act ought to be severed from any other idea which will encourage it, and the idea of a good act should be dissociated from any idea which is calculated to discourage it. In the affairs of ordinary life, cases are known in which even grown-up men will never venture to mount a horse because they were once badly thrown. Similarly, people who have been tricked by a loafer sometimes become extremely hard in dealing even with the deserving poor. We have a proverbial saying that "nothing succeeds like success," which means that success creates that self-confidence which is one of the conditions for further success. But we might with equal or greater truth frame another proverb that "nothing fails like failure"; for failure destroys that confidence and prepares the way for further failure. It is as an antidote to this evil association of ideas that the saying was invented: "If at first you don't succeed: try, try, try again." It is notorious that schoolboys play best when they are on the winning side; and to play well a losing game is one of the best tests of well-knit character. Those who can do this have learnt the habit

of doing their best regardless of success or failure—or in other words, of dissociating ideas which ought to be dissociated. Again it is well known that stammering, though originally due to a real difficulty, becomes an inveterate habit chiefly through the thought of inability which crops up as soon as the lips begin to move; and that the only cure is to get rid of this association of ideas, and then by succeeding once to entertain the idea of succeeding twice, and then of succeeding always.

Turning to the spiritual life, nothing is more fatal than to get imbued with the idea that "when a certain temptation comes I am sure to yield"; for the expectation prepares the way for its own fulfillment. To dissociate such ideas is not merely a benefit but a positive duty. Finally, most occasions of sin are due to association of ideas. The drunkard can never see a public house without immediately conceiving the idea of entering it. Similarly in cases when the idea of committing sin with a certain person has become attached to the sight of that person. It even happens in cases of vicious habits, that when once the sin has been committed at a certain place, it will occur again whenever the person happens to come into the same place, etc. Hence it is that when confessors have to deal with occasions of sin which can not be avoided, they are supposed to instruct the penitent how the *proximate* occasion can be turned into a *remote* occasion; and one of the natural means by which this is to be done is by acquiring a habit of dissociating the idea of sin from the presence of the object.

When once the principles just enunciated have been grasped, through the medium of concrete instances, their utility, in self-training at least, will be obvious; and from experience with self it is easy to see what part they should play in the training of the young.

CHAPTER X

THE PHYSIOLOGY OF HABIT.

So far we have studied the psychological basis of habits, which consists in what is called the association of ideas. Let us now pass further back and consider their physiological basis.

Modern investigations into the structure and functions of living organisms have shown us that the nervous system is made up of a vast complicated network of tiny threads, in each of which resides a pent-up force ready to issue in motion as soon as it is let loose by what is called a stimulus; and the letting loose is accomplished more or less as the explosion of a cannon is brought about by the fall of the trigger. The nerve-threads are like electric wires along which the vital force passes from one part of the body to another; and when the force reaches the end of a wire it results in a movement of the body in that part.

Moreover, these threads are arranged in systems ramifying out from certain centres called ganglia, just as telephone wires radiate out in all directions from a central office—so that every subscriber can get himself switched on to every other. Under such a arrangement what happens is this. Suppose some one pricks my calf with a pin. This is the stimulus which, like the fall of a trigger, sets certain pent-up forces in motion. Immediately the force runs along the nerve

from the place pricked to the ganglion at the other end; and here the current may be switched on to a certain other nerve so as to run up to the brain and produce a consciousness of the prick. But the main current runs straight off to the arm and as far as the hand, setting the various muscles in motion. The result is that the hand moves down to the calf (and perhaps even the calf moves up towards the hand) and then follows a rubbing to alleviate the pain. This process can of course be accompanied by consciousness due to the division of the current just described; but in itself it is so mechanical that it can go on while the mind is thinking of something else, or even asleep. Nay more, even after death the same kind of activity can be elicited for a certain time. The standard experiment is to make a frog rub its own back in response to the prick of a pin even after the animal's head has been cut off, so that it has no brains left and therefore no consciousness. This "up the middle and down the sides" process—to borrow a term from the dancing saloon—is called "motor-reflex activity." Where sense or rational consciousness enters in, this is chiefly in a directive or restrictive way, rather than as the actual force producing the motion. In other words, the mind can switch on and switch off the connections, and thus allow the process to run its course, or stop it in the middle, or give it one out of two possible directions, etc. But whatever bodily motion there is in living beings is all achieved by this letting loose of pent-up

forces in the nerve-system, and in no other way, as far as we know.*

Herein lies the explanation of what we call the "spontaneousness" of actions—how it is that the baby begins to breathe as soon as it is born, to cry almost immediately after, to suck the teat as soon as it is placed between the lips, and to swallow the milk thus sucked. It explains how the eyelid closes when the eyeball is hurt, how the hand goes up to protect the head as soon as it is threatened with a blow, how the fingers move to the place where pain is felt, how they scratch where there is an itch, how the legs kick out as soon as constraint is felt, how the eyes follow an attractive object, how the hands reach out to take hold of it, etc., etc.

VICES AND PASSIONS

Now let us see how these facts of physiology bear on the formation of habits in the young. Motor-reflex activity may be called a habit implanted by nature: for it fulfills the essential definition of habit, viz., a stable and permanent facility to act. In fact, the facility is so great that the difficulty lies not in acting but rather in not-acting, when the spontaneous forces of nature are once set to work. On the other hand, by a habit is usually meant something which is acquired by repeated acts; whereas here the facility already exists before a single act is performed. Our business therefore in this matter is not so much to induce a

* Of course the mind can take a greater part in the process than is here depicted, and can itself provide the stimulus which sets the machinery in motion. At present we are merely considering the simpler cases.

habit as to control it; or in other words, to create contrary habits of direction and restraint.

A little study will show that almost all the vices of which a man is capable—those, I mean, which involve any bodily action in their accomplishment—owe their execution to the presence of this motor-reflex activity. The strongest instance is, of course, the reproductive instinct, in which the sense of a want is followed so instinctively by the movements calculated to fulfill that want, that unless the mind is extremely vigilant at the first moment of the temptation, the execution of its dictates may take place before the will can interfere. And when once the motor-reflex activities are set in motion, the absorption of the senses can become so complete that the higher faculties have great difficulty in exercising control—so that the only safeguard is keen vigilance against the first beginnings even of thought. The same is true of all other passions, anger, fear, greed, etc., each in its degree. We speak of them as forces which "carry us away." The metaphor is just the right one. Any man who has analyzed his state when under the influence say of anger, will find that a great volume of force is working its way through the body, creating a violent commotion in its organs, setting the tongue in rapid motion to say fierce words and the hands to do fierce things. This panorama of passionate activity goes on as it were by itself, while the rational mind looks on like a spectator —disapproving, regretting, and even protesting against it, but—unless some sharp shake-up occurs—doing little, to stop it till the storm is over. Deeds performed by passion without deliberate malice do not proceed

from the initiative of the will, but from the loosing of the pent-up forces of motor-reflex activity. The will is responsible for them, indeed, but in a negative way—that is, by allowing them to go on uninterrupted instead of breaking in and turning off the current. In very violent cases the will actually becomes powerless to interfere, because the attention, on which the will depends, is entirely drowned in the tide. In this case the responsibility, if any, lies further back—for not shutting the floodgates of passion before the current became too strong.

By this analysis we can understand why our lower impulses are called passions. The word comes from *patior*, I suffer, or undergo something done to me—the idea of passivity. In their own sphere of impulse the passions are of course the very quintessence of activity. It is only from the point of view of the rational will that they are called passions—that is, things which the will rather suffers than does.

EXERCISE OF RESTRAINT

The work of training in regard to these forces is therefore, first, to prevent the motor-reflex activities from acquiring a greater facility than they already possess. For as with trains of mental association, so also is it with trains of spontaneous activity—they certainly gain in force and intensity with each repetition. And what is more—to use the previous metaphor—the more frequently the trigger which lets them loose falls, the more ready is it to fall in the future. Hence the vital importance of checking the very first exhibition of temper or any other vice in a child. For if indulged

in with impunity once, it will be indulged all the more readily the second time, and so with increasing facility and intensity, till there is practically no checking it—and so the foundations of a violent character are firmly laid. On the other hand, a severe check administered the first time will not only call the attention of the child to the need of exercising self-restraint, but will (through the association of ideas) provide a counterpoise whenever the first beginnings of passion are felt. And if the check is repeated until it becomes vivid in the mind, it will go far to obviate the indulgence altogether. It is always possible for a man to be of a passionate nature and yet to control it by the strength of the rational will. But where the will is weak, this exercise of control is extremely unlikely to take place; and even where it is strong, the amount of effort required means so much waste of energy which might be directed to better uses. Now, no one would deliberately condemn a fellow-being to a needless struggle with his passions if it could be avoided. But those parents who fail to check the formation of passionate habits in their children, not only run the risk of turning them out criminals, but, short of that, impose a serious handicap on their future lives, by placing them under the necessity of a constant conflict with adverse forces which, with better training, would never have been arrayed against them.

But besides the violent passions, there are other impulses which also belong to the sphere of motor-reflex activity and which, while not violent in themselves, can by repeated indulgence grow into a habit leading to results more or less disastrous. Take for instance

the spontaneous action of a baby in putting out its hands to take hold of anything which pleases its eye. It is an innocent action in itself. But if indulged indiscriminately and without check, the habit thus formed will have an important influence on future character. The child, on seeing an object which looks nice, feels a natural wish to taste it. Instantly its motor-reflex activity is aroused. Out go the hands to grasp it; and a moment later, into the mouth it goes. This is exactly what any small child would do; and unless the lesson is effectually inculcated: "You must not touch *everything* you see," the spontaneous habit of letting the hands follow the eyes which will soon culminate in pilfering lumps of sugar from the table, then afterwards in stealing apples from Farmer Dobson's orchard, and later on, perhaps, an almost irresistible impulse to take money out of the cash box whenever the chance occurs.

CONTROL OF THE BODY

In other words, one of the most important parts of training consists in inducing a habit of proper control over the "spontaneous" movements of the body. The application is universal. It covers all those movements which go to the make-up of proper deportment—graceful gait and carriage, repose of manner, the habit of sitting still, restraint of the eyes so as not to pry too curiously into things, or stare restlesesly about or fixedly into people's faces, etc., etc. It is here worth while noting that the discipline thus practiced with regard to things which are normally colorless, will also play an important part in questions of moral con-

duct. For if a proper power of self-control is made habitual even in small matters, where no evil consequences would follow from want of it, the facility thus acquired will apply itself naturally where self-control is a moral duty and the neglect of it a sin.

The word "self-control" is the key of the situation. To be master of one's own movements in thought, word and deed, is, we might say, the very definition of a man, and that which precisely distinguishes him from the lower animals. Even in mankind all external action is executed through the process of motor-reflex activity and, so far as consciousness enters in, by the association of ideas. But in the brutes these two systems of force are supreme. They dominate the whole life of the animal, and work themselves out unimpeded according to their own law. Once add the rational soul, and a new principle is introduced. It is just as when a rider is placed on the back of a horse. Previously the animal could do just what its own impulses spontaneously suggested. Now it still retains the same forces and tendencies, but they are under the mind of another being and are subject to his will—to be used so far as they serve his purposes of travel, and to be restrained so far as they thwart it. I do not mean that the rational soul of a man is another being different from the human animal which it is his business to rule; but for the purposes of our subject it can be regarded in that relation. Our body and its organs are the indispensable steed which is to carry us along the road of life; and it is our business to know the forces with which that steed is endowed, and to subordinate them to rational ends.

And this is the results which habits are intended to secure—habits which, while allowing the natural energies of the body their healthy scope, control and direct them according to the sound dictates of the reason, so as to make them issue in that kind of action which is alone worthy of a man.

CHAPTER XI

THE RATIONAL BASIS OF HABIT.

In the two previous sections we have seen something of the physiological and psychological basis of habit, but they will have to be considered a little more before we come to the intellectual basis of the same. The physiological basis, we have seen, lies in the mechanism of the nervous system, commencing from a stimulus at one end and ending with a spontaneous muscular movement at the other. We can distinguish three modes in this kind of activity:—

(1) Where the force set in motion by the stimulus passes through the ganglia without reaching the brain —the short circuit, as we may call it. The whole action is absolutely spontaneous without the intervention of consciousness. Typical examples are the instinct to breathe, to cry, to swallow, to cough, wink, sneeze, etc., and also to move the hand to a place which itches or hurts. These acts are performed with perfect facility from the very first, and equally well when awake or asleep. And so far as they are worked through the "short circuit" alone, they are absolutely outside all control.

(2) Where the current of force divides and in addition to the "short circuit" takes a "long circuit" through the brain (see figure). Here the spontaneous short-circuit action proceeds as before, but it is accompanied by consciousness of what is going on, and therefore admits of control by the switching-off power

of the mind. Be it noted, however, that as the current of force takes time for transmission, the short-circuit is completed and the action begun before consciousness is excited; and therefore in these cases the control of the mind does not consist in preventing the movement altogether, but in stopping it after it has begun. Unless the mind is alert and the will habituated to prompt self-assertion, the action may proceed a considerable way before it is checked, and may even come to completion while the mind is getting ready to put the veto on. If the movement is sinful in any way, the will is bound to interfere as soon as the mind is conscious of its duty; and in proportion as this interference is neglected, in that proportion is the act imputable as sin. If the will simply consents to allow the action to go on, it is fully guilty—say of mortal sin. But if the will protests and makes some effort of suppression, the guilt is less pronounced, and may amount to a venial sin only—for want either of advertence or deliberation or consent. This is simply the ordinary scholastic doctrine of the *actus humanus*, the *motus primus primi et secundi*, etc., analyzed on the lines of modern psychology.



(3) The third case is where the action is not in itself so spontaneous as to begin without consciousness, and which is therefore voluntary in its origin—for instance walking, speaking, writing, playing the piano,

etc. Such habits have, in the first instance, to be acquired by deliberate acts, in which the mind is the initiating factor, while the physiological forces are subservient to its dictates. But by repeated acts, a certain facility is arrived at, and then the physical machinery gets as it were into a groove, and acquires a promptness of action which is practically spontaneous. Thus we perform the immensely complicated process of walking without the least reflection and without any apparent exercise of the mind or will; and the same when we read a book aloud or play the piano. The printed letters or notes, as soon as perceived, stimulate corresponding muscular movements in the members—the whole process going on through the "short circuit" with some faint accompaniment of consciousness perhaps, but so automatically that it will continue without interruption even when the mind is altogether absorbed in something else.

For actions of this type we have a double responsibility—first for having acquired the habit by voluntary and deliberate choice; and then for each individual act performed, over which we ought to possess perfect control. But the difficulty of control is sometimes very great—first, because of the tendency of the physical forces to act spontaneously on the least provocation; and secondly, because of the habit of inadvertence which has grown up in the mind. Hence it is that people who have acquired some vicious practice in early life without restraint, and in later years wish to break off, find themselves engaged in a struggle in which theoretically they are the masters, but practically they are worsted again and again by the force of habit

which has by this time become practically motor-reflex and almost instinctive.

This difficulty is increased by the second or psychological basis of habits, which consists in the association of ideas. We use "ideas" here as including sense images as well as intellectual notions, so far as either of them exercise any kind of influence on thought, word or action. As soon as a pleasant object is perceived an instinctive liking for it springs up, and then a spontaneous effort to secure it and enjoy it. If thwarted, the child will cry, and may, through its parents, get what it cannot secure by itself. "Crying for what it wants" can thus become a habit, and in any case there grows up an association between the idea of wanting a thing and getting it, which, if not properly restrained, will issue in a confirmed habit. The same applies to shirking or rejecting things which are not liked. It is this association of likes and dislikes with the idea of acting according to them which lays the foundation of an utterly unrestrained and lawless life—a life which *may* not run to much evil where the temperament of the child is equable, but which will run to as much evil as circumstances may suggest, and, where there are strong predispositions, will result in every kind of viciousness.

SELF-CONTROL AGAIN

The essential aim of training, therefore, as we have already observed, lies in securing self-control. Even in the spontaneous motor-reflex activities some control is possible. The inclination to cough, to sneeze, or to move the limbs shows itself in consciousness by certain

symptoms before the action takes place; and with proper determination such movements can be moderated in intensity or even suppressed altogether. Thus a man who realizes that a sneeze will bring about an explosion of dynamite, will have a strong incentive to exercise self-restraint, and under such a motive he will probably succeed. Similarly, by proper training, children can be taught to cough with moderation, to resist the inclination to scratch themselves, at least in company, and to avoid showing how much they are bored, etc., etc.

When once the physiology of self-restraint is understood in relation to these innocent and spontaneous forms of activity, the application to more serious matters will be manifest. Every kind of self-restraint helps in the formation of the character; so that a man who has learnt not to yawn in company will find himself greatly helped in restraining temptations say to theft, anger, or impurity.

But if this self-control is desirable and possible in spontaneous habits, *a fortiori* is it so in acquired habits. And the first pre-requisite for self-control is advertence of the mind. Not to notice what you are doing is a pure animal condition; to notice what you are doing is the prerogative of a man. Hence, while in spontaneous habits the object is to elevate short-circuit acts into long-circuit acts, so in acquired habits the aim is to prevent what are originally long-circuit acts from degenerating into short-circuit acts—in other words, to secure as much consciousness in action as possible.

The idea must not, of course, be pressed too far. A large amount of our activity is intended to work spontaneously. This is nature's economy, to save brain-wear and to reserve vital energy for higher things. To be always reflecting how our legs move before moving them, would be ridiculous. No, let the spontaneous remain spontaneous so far as it works on the right lines; but do not let spontaneousness extend itself unduly so as to remove our actions outside the sphere of control. Let us at least be in full possession of ourselves whether anything of ethical import is involved.

This quality of "knowing what we are doing" can be called by different names. In popular language it is called "wide-awake," or "on the spot," or "very much alive"; and a man notably wanting in it said to be unreflective, thoughtless, dreamy, absent-minded, abstracted, or "in the moon." In cases of emergency it is called "presence of mind," and the want of it "losing one's head," etc. But putting aside particular aspects, and looking at the matter scientifically, it means that whenever there is any activity, either in the way of bodily movement or of the play of imagination or feeling, the intellect is always on the alert to attend to what is going on, and by realizing the situation can form suitable judgments as to the proper course to pursue—whether the forces which are spontaneously working or about to work should be encouraged, modified, or suppressed altogether, or whether some other kind of movement should be initiated instead.

THE MACHINERY OF WILL

This advertence is the first prerequisite to self-control; for it places in consciousness the object-matter over which the control is to be exercised. The controlling agent is of course the rational will. This faculty is perfectly simple in its construction and working, for it has nothing to do but utter its fiat: "Let this be done, or let it *not* be done." But in order to prepare the way for this pronouncement, something besides advertence is required. It is not enough to have before the mind a consciousness of the various alternatives among which choice is to be made. There must be some judgment on the alternatives in the light of general ideas bearing on conduct; and these general ideas are what we call principles. The will, though absolute in its power of saying yes or no, demands some motive or reason before it can decide; and herein lies the intellectual basis of habit, which is nothing other than the establishment of principles firmly in the mind. The radical instinct of the will is to love good wherever seen, and to embrace it; and it is repugnant to its very constitution to choose evil as such. If in every situation the choice lay between an unqualified good and an unqualified evil, the choice of the will would infallibly fall on the side of the good. Our moral probation lies precisely in this, that all things which come before us are good *in some way* —good for the body, for the senses, if not for the soul. Every indulgence has its proper time and place, but there are places and times where it is not good. What happens is that such and such an act, which could

be legitimately performed under other circumstances, must not be performed under *these* circumstances. In such cases the will feels attracted to the act, but is at the same time conscious of the duty of abstention. And herein lies its potentiality of evil. It can concentrate itself upon the attraction, which is in some sense good, and yet ignore the prohibition which is in another sense good; and then, having the choice between a lower motive which is more intense and a higher motive which is more worthy, it can throw its weight, so to speak, into the scale of the lower, and thus reaches a decision in favor of the evil course.

This interaction of the will and the intellect is of the greatest importance in self-analysis. On the one hand, if the mind is strongly imbued with a certain idea, its natural effect is to incline the will to assent to it and reduce it to action. But the will has the power of turning the attention of the intellect to some other idea, which is thus brought up into vividness while the previous idea is correspondingly obscured, and thrust aside out of the center of observation. Just as a skater can adjust his balance so as to sweep round in the direction he wants, so the will can shift the center of advertence, and bring the attracting force of one idea to bear upon itself rather than another.

Finally, the power of choice is an absolute one, lying outside the control of any but one's own self; and by it each man is arbiter of his own destiny. Hence in a certain way no man has the power of training the will of another. The training of the will must essentially be self-training. All we can do with those under us is to work on the environment,

by determining the material, whether physical, psychological, or intellectual, on which the will has to work. We can by adroit expedients promote the formation of good habits of body, imagination, feeling and even thought, and by this means create a condition of things favourable to good choice. But when all is said and done, the ultimate formation of character is the work of the *self;* and no one has any real say in it but the self.

And so in the end it comes to this. We can place before us the ideal of what we want our children to become as men. We can reduce that ideal to the form of concrete principles. We can take every means in our power to instill those principles into the mind of our pupils, and to fix them there as intellectual habits. We can try to induce the young to make those principles their own, and by regular reflection and application to bring them to practice. We can facilitate the attainment of the desired result by watching carefully over the first beginnings and gradual growth of habits both of body, imagination, feeling and thought. In short, we can do all the preparation-work for building up the edifice of character, and of the best and noblest character. But unless the child takes kindly to all this, and assimilates it, and throws the weight of his own good-will into the work of training himself on the lines thus laid out for him, it will all be so much labor lost. For we can make the design and provide materials for the house; but only he has within him the power of deciding whether he would build it up and dwell in it and make it his home.

CHAPTER XII

MEANS OF TRAINING.

By this time we may consider our first two questions fairly answered, at least in outline—namely: What sort of result do we wish our training to produce? and, What are the materials given us out of which to produce this result? Our third question has also already received a partial answer in treating the second, but it is now time to take it up systematically and ask, What are the means by which the desired result is to be produced? Reverting to the principle already laid down,—viz., that all real training is self-training—it will be seen at once that any efforts which we make in the direction of training others must be regarded as subsidiary and external aids,—first to induce self-training, and secondly, to help it on either in speed or direction, or both. Care must be taken that our helps are real helps and not hindrances to the process; for the mischief of excessive or mistaken interference with the internal autonomy of human character is inestimable. Our attitude throughout must be that of a servant.

Man is often called "lord of creation" and "master of nature"; but as lord of creation his rule is a politic and not an arbitrary one, and his method of exercising mastership is not to dictate to nature, but to know and observe the conditions under which nature acts and,

by manipulating these conditions, to exercise an *indirect* control, not over the laws of nature but over their actual workings—using one law which he can control as a means of determining the exercise of other laws which he cannot control. Thus all the wonderful services rendered to mankind by air, water, fire, steam, electricity and the rest are secured by the most careful and subservient manipulation of the conditions under which these forces pass from the latent to the active state. It is nature itself which turns the steam engine; man merely boxes-up the water and applies the fire and opens the valve. By the proper adjustment of metals and of wires the same fluid which, in the form of lightning, strikes a man dead, is harnessed as it were to machinery and issues in unlimited power available for human use. In the department of life a like subserviency to nature has to be observed. No man by taking thought can add one cubit to his stature; but by proper food and exercise he can turn a weak frame into a strong one, and a clumsy structure into an agile one. Equally or more so when we come to the higher regions of intellectual and moral life. The materials out of which character is built may be summed up as "a cluster of internal faculties and external opportunities." We do not make either the faculties nor the opportunities, for both of them lie in the constitution of the universe. All we can do is to discover them, analyze them, weigh the relations which subsist between them, and then seek out the adjustments which, if effected, will enable the faculties to make the most of the opportunities with which they are surrounded.

From this kind of manipulation, if adroitly exercised, two benefits will follow:—First, a development of the faculties themselves to the full extent of their latent capability; and secondly, a development of the opportunities around, so as to facilitate the best and most fruitful use of them. Thus the internal and the external factors of the case act and re-act upon each other. Initially the faculties lie in a dormant condition. But they are of their own nature responsive to external suggestion—or, in technical terminology, are actuated by the presentation of their proper object. Given a rich, suggestive and stimulating environment, and the faculties will waken up and develop rapidly. Otherwise they will remain stagnant for want of material on which to work. Then in turn, the more the faculties waken and exert themselves, the more susceptible they become to the environment, and the more efficacious in making the most of it. Thus gradually a man becomes more and more a master of himself and his powers, and through them, more and more master of his circumstances instead of being their slave. And so he will not only respond fully to every opportunity which comes his way, but will go out and seek further opportunities, and in a certain sense make them for himself.

INEQUALITY OF POWERS

There is an old and unsettled dispute among the schoolmen as to whether all human souls are radically equal in constitution and power, or whether they possess inherently different degrees of efficiency. The

question is of little practical value on account of our dependence on the body.

The bodily gifts of nature are many and varied, and are also unequally distributed; and hence a huge difference of quality in the composition of the brain, nerves, sensitive organs and the rest. And since all our functionings in life have to be carried on through this conjoint instrument called the body, it follows that men come into existence with an immense initial difference of mental and even moral capacity, according to the qualities of these different organs and the perfection or imperfection of their workings. Hence there is no difficulty in acknowledging the fact that some people are born stupid, others clever, some weak and others strong, some sluggish and heavy as elephants, others vivacious and active as greyhounds, some caloric, others lymphatic, some enterprising and others apathetic, some endowed with genius, others with talent, and others again devoid of either. Even in the moral order there are some who are almost literally born angels in the flesh, while others are painfully prone to anger, sloth, gluttony, lasciviousness and the rest—possibly the outcome of ancestral indulgence, and possibly due to an ill-balanced or morbid personal physique. So that taking our material at first presented to us, we find a wonderful variety in initial capacities for training, and a still more wonderful variety of responsiveness to training.

Hence arises a twofold problem:—First, how to gauge the capacities to the subject to which our training-process has to be applied; and secondly, how to

adjust the training process so as to suit each individual case. No theory will settle either of these two questions. The answer to the first is obtainable only by observation, and the second is merely a matter of experiment found successful and persevered in, or found futile and abandoned—or at most, repeated from time to time until success or futility is finally ascertained. The most we can do is to lay down the general principles common to all training, followed perhaps by certain corollaries, or *scholia* regarding adaptations to particular cases, and a study of certain type-specimens of innate disposition to which most of the examples found in actual life can approximately be reduced.

While on the one hand the training *of self* consists in applying the powers of the soul to the environment, on the contrary the training of *another* consists in applying the environment to the powers of the soul. This latter, in simple language, means the exercise of influence from without; and this influence can be reduced to three heads which comprise all the means of training at our disposal; namely, instruction, discipline and example.

INSTRUCTION AND DISCIPLINE

Of these three, instruction and discipline stand as a pair complementary to each other, while example covers the ground of both, though in a way peculiarly its own. Taking therefore the first two together, we may say that instruction means a communication between intellect and intellect, while discipline means a communication between will and will. Instruction has for

its object the infusion of knowledge, while discipline has for its object to instigate and direct action. Instruction conveys thoughts and facts, while discipline enforces principles. In a certain way the two may be said to overlap each other. Thus the process of assimilating instruction is in itself a discipline, while on the other hand the rules and regulations of discipline are materials of instruction. Moreover, unless the two are worked together, very little progress will be made in either department. It is perfectly useless for a professor or teacher to pour out instruction, unless something is done to compel attention, retention, repetition, oral or written exercises to ensure assimilation and to test its correctness, etc.—all of which means discipline. On the other hand, it is useless imposing a code of discipline upon the young unless the code is made intelligible by instruction. Nor will discipline develop into a life-long habit so long as it means merely an unquestioning obedience to orders. The code must appeal to the sound sense of the people by its manifest reasonableness and utility; or in other words, must fix itself in the mind in the form of principles.

AN IMPORTANT DISTINCTION

Having made clear the interrelations between instruction and discipline, we can now note a few salient points of each before passing on to example. According to its subject-matter, instruction may be divided into secular and sacred. Secular instruction includes languages, literature, history, geography, and mathematics as essentials, with perhaps science, draw-

ing and music included as luxuries. To these must be added special subjects such as art, technics, medicine, law, etc., for professional purposes. Sacred instruction is practically reducible to teaching the Catechism, with Bible and Church history thrown in. Normally all these subjects are provided for by our school and college authorities; and it is no part of our present purpose to work over them in detail or to discuss the principles of success in the teaching of them. The distinction we wish rather to come to is that between *formal* and *informal* instruction. Formal instruction is that which is done *ex professo* as a sort of set lesson, whether at school or at home. Such instruction is "strict business," and the pupil is obliged to attend to what he is taught, and to render an account of it on the spot or afterwards. Informal instruction is the conveyance of instruction through other means such as conversation, reading or observation, in which case the acquisition of the knowledge is a matter of pastime and pleasure, free from obligation and from the need of rendering an account of it later on.

While allowing that the grinding process of formal instruction is indispensable as furnishing the substantials of knowledge and training, it is important to realize how unattractive and inadequate it is unless supplemented by the informal—or in other words, what a large part of turning-out a really well-educated man depends on the extra-official part of his training. One of the incidental defects of current education lies precisely here. In the old days, when education was confined to the select classes, every boy undergoing

education found himself in an educated home circle. The father and mother knew with maturity the things which the boy knew with immaturity. Hence the boy found himself constantly learning from the conversation of his parents, from the books which the home library put in his way, from the travels and experiences and opinions of his elders on all subjects; and by this informal intercourse his knowledge was gradually turned into culture. Nowadays, except in those select circles, it is the general rule that the boy is educated far in advance of his parents, who cannot communicate anything either of knowledge or culture to their offspring, simply because they do not possess it. The rising matriculator is usually the son of unmatriculated parents, and the pupil of the lower schools is frequently the son of parents who can barely read and write. In this case the education of the child is strictly confined to formal instruction, with such a modicum of the informal as intercourse with his teachers outside school and the use of the school library can afford —the parents being much in the condition of a hen who has hatched a brood of ducklings, and looks on with astonishment to see them swim.

Even among the select classes—I mean educated children of educated parents—the range of informal instruction is greatly limited nowadays—first by the prevalence of boarding schools, which withdraw the children almost entirely from the home circle and the fellowship of adults, and throw them into a society consisting entirely of boys like themselves; and secondly, on account of the broken-up character of mod-

ern family life,—what with residence in town flats, and immersion in business druing the day, and clubs, and dinings out, and parties, and the whole range of social entertainments when the day is over. In this way also the part played by the parents in the up-bringing of their children is seriously minimized. This, however, is one of the calamities of modern civilization about which I may have something more to say afterwards when treating of the subject of example.

CHAPTER XIII

INFORMAL INSTRUCTION

Having spoken of the important part played by what I have called "informal instruction" in the education of the young, it will be eminently useful to enter into some details showing exactly what is meant. In doing so, we shall have to overlap somewhat into the department of "example"; but this does not matter so long as the thing is made clear.

Take a few examples of what "informal instruction" means—that is to say, instruction which comes by way of pleasure and pastime and not as a task—such as one would expect to find pervading an educated home-circle. The first instance is social intercourse with grown-up people of culture. Listening to the conversation of their elders is one of the most expeditious ways of bringing knowledge to maturity. All sorts of subjects taught at school, and others also, will constantly be touched upon. The adults will discuss politics, history, literature, science and the arts, throwing out lightly an array of facts, thoughts, opinions, experiences, etc., some of which will cast a further light on the boy's studies, and others new lights altogether. From this alone the listening boy will begin to find out "what a lot of things there are" in the world to be known, and what a "lot" there is to be thought and said about them. And thus he learns the feasibility of thinking for himself, and

gradually acquires it. But besides this, his curiosity will be aroused to know more of the things thus slightly hinted at, and this will lead to questions and to reading—the latter leading to further questions, and so on—the horizon of the young mind widening more and more, and his faculties expanding gradually under the process. Compare the advantage of a cultured home like this with the barrack-life of a boarding college, where the boy is herded with a pack of other boys whose staple commodity of conversation is nothing higher than games and tricks and toffy—or more generically, "grub."

Secondly, let us turn to the collective talents of the household. The father's taste, let us say, runs chiefly in the line of literature. Not seldom the conversation leads to producing a volume of the poets, and some *a propos* passage is read with appreciative comments; the boy listening with interest, and finding out by immediate experience the charm of the great masterpieces, which will result in reading them for himself later on. Some of the grandest passages in Shakespeare are familiar to me *verbatim* to this day, simply because I heard my father read them aloud when I was young; and the same with Milton and Wordsworth and some of the other poets. Then secondly, one of the uncles, who frequently pays a visit, is an artist. Looking over his latest sketch-books immediately suggests imitation. The boys begin to draw and to show their maiden efforts, and look on with wonder at the masterful way in which the uncle sketches out on the margin the right thing, in stimulating con-

trast to the wrong one. Under such informal instruction, no wonder if every youngster in the family soon learns to draw; with a resultant wakening of intelligence in the observation of shape, size, contour and color, which soon becomes to him the basis of a developed taste for art. Another of the uncles is an architect, another a lawyer, etc. Two sisters play the piano, and one the violin. Being people of taste, the music they play will be of the higher order; and thus the groundwork of culture is laid all round. It should be remarked that culture does not necessarily involve personal skill in any of the arts. It means an intelligent appreciation of them, some or all, the acquisition of an interest in them and a taste regarding them—which may not amount to that of a connoisseur, but will at least reach some degree of refinement, and raise the person possessing it above the vulgar and dull utilitarian herd. And this taste will reflect itself ever afterwards in all things—in dress and manners, and furniture, and conversation, and choice of amusement—and will impart a social charm which is so instinctively appreciated whenever met with, and which is often so noticeably wanting in the turn-out of our boarding schools and colleges, and this for the same reason as before.

The third kind of informal instruction lies in the outings of the family—their choice of entertainments, their travels and expeditions to objects of interest and renown, etc. The cultured family will be found frequenting the art galleries, the classical concert halls, the oratorios, the Italian and Wagnerian operas,

and the plays of Shakespeare—but not the latest comic opera or sensational melodrama. And they will with due discretion take their older children with them, not only to see and hear, but to get the benefit of the conversation afterwards at home. Then again, in their travels they will not be all for the fashionable watering-places, and the promenade, and the pavilion, and the skating-rink and the niggers on the sands. Now it will be a tour in Wild Wales or Westmoreland to see the beauties of nature, now a visit to the great cathredals or abbeys, or to historical battlefields and castles—every one of which is a step forward in the refinement and culture of the children they take along with them. What chances of this sort can come in the way of a boy boxed up in a boarding school?

The fourth great vehicle of informal instruction lies in the opportunity of reading which is afforded by free access to the home library. Boys are naturally curious, and many of them have a strong instinct for reading as soon as they can read with facility. Force books upon them, and they will immediately feel an aversion, as if the reading were a task. Let them ramble about a good library and take from it any book they fancy, and it is sometimes astonishing what solid and serious volumes they will work through with keen interest and mental profit. But one thing is vital. It must not be a library "specially selected for the young." Of course let books pernicious to the young be carefully weeded out and reposed under lock and key with closed doors, so that

they cannot even see the titles; and let there be books specially suited for the young which they may choose if they like. But what I mean is, the library must represent the adult mind and capability, and not be depressed down to the actual level of the child—or else it will never be an engine for lifting him up. Boys as a rule get quite sick of being treated as children, and resent it, and are depressed and rendered desperate by it. They soon feel the inspiration to be men, and find a peculiar satisfaction in trying to do what men do. If this takes the form of an ambition, not to smoke and drink and swear, but to read the books which their father and mother and uncles are interested in, it is certainly to be encouraged, and will do more to develop the maturity of the incipient man than anything in the way of formal instruction will do.

A whole article could be given to enumerating in particular the run which I made on my father's library between the ages of ten and fourteen; the amount of solid adult literature which I devoured, and the hundreds of matters on which I became informed, and which I remember clearly now even though I have never read a line on those particular subjects since. It is no exaggeration to say that I owe more mental culture (and education in the true sense) from my free run on that library, small though it was, than I ever derived or could have derived from school—and this not only because of the reading actually done, but because of the taste for solid reading thereby acquired.

Do not our school authorities sometimes miss this point badly by their assiduous care to collect together a library "suited for the young"—that is to say, eliminating from it almost all the books which would be suited to adult readers, and reducing it to lives of the saints written in a goody-goody style,—supposed "to suit the boy's mind"—and for the rest, "story books for boys," most of them equally jejune from the educational point of view. This remark does not mean a depreciation of pious books, but let them be manly ones; nor does it detract from story-books, but let them be informing and educating ones. What I mean is, we often seem to assume that the boy's mind borders on imbecility, and do our best to keep it there; whereas the boy's mind is usually bristling at least with aspirations after manliness, and we ought to do our best to help it there.

HOME AND SCHOOL COMPARED.

There are other kinds of informal instructions likely to arise from residence in a cultured home; but these will be better treated of under the headings of discipline and example. Let us enumerate those which we have got. They are (1) conversational intercourse with adult minds; (2) the exhibition of adult talents; (3) participation in the entertainments, expeditions, visits and travels of adults; and (4) the free run on a well selected adult library. Now let us turn to the other side of the question and ask, how a boy is likely to fare if cut off from these home influences, and thrown into the midst of the ordinary school and college system?

In the first place, life at a school or college is usually a sort of barrack-life led in surroundings plain, bare, utilitarian and devoid of all ostensible culture. What is more, the boys themselves are herded together in a society which consists of boys alone. Apart from official dealings, they are entirely isolated from anything like a colloquial relation with adult minds. The instruction in the schoolroom is altogether formal; that is to say, has the nature of a task imposed on the masters to fulfill and the boys to submit to; and for this reason is likely to be hated by all boys who have not in them an innate thirst for knowledge and an enthusiasm in acquiring it. Nor is it in the rank and file of school-teachers that we can look for anything calculated to rise above the level of the drudging pedagogue and task-master. The fact is, the rank and file of our teachers are often persons of poor educational antecedents, taking education in the higher sense as culminating in culture. Education as they have experienced it, and as they naturally tend to impart it, means practically the acquisition of a certain amout of fact-knowledge, such as is contained in our school text-books, *plus* a certain facility in giving an account of that fact-knowledge in the form of written and oral examinations. The whole of this is possible, given a certain modicum of attention, memory and of intelligence, and can subsist in its entirety to the full satisfaction of the examining body, without involving anything which one can call culture. It is in fact a mere warehousing of mental goods and the handing of them out again on demand.

At the same time led us not be one-sided. This grind work is absolutely necessary and unavoidable, and gives the skeleton at least on which the flesh of culture can grow. The only thing is to realize that unless something is added, a mere surface education skin-deep will be the result, instead of the culture in which true education consists. Nor is it to be denied that, given a set of schoolmasters who are really cultured men, and not mere cram-men themselves, a great deal of culture can be super-imposed on the drill of the school-system—or rather, the school-system can be redeemed from its bondage and can become a continual course of culture.

THE WORST-PAID PROFESSION

But then, as I have said, unfortunately the rank and file of our school-teachers are not always men of culture. Nor are they ever likely to be, so long as their profession is, on the whole, the worst paid business in the world—considering, I mean, the high mission before them, and the high personal qualities which are required for a really competent trainer as distinguished from a mere teacher or didactic taskmaster.

We talk largely of the value and importance of education, as if it were the most vital affair of the age. And such it is; and therefore those who are entrusted with the work of education ought to be the best-educated men of the age—men in whom education means culture; men whose personal character breathes out an atmosphere of culture, and spreads

it by contagion to all who are placed in contact with them. Such choice specimens are rare. "To form one cultured man," says Emerson, "you must have a whole society of such." In other words, it is practically impossible to secure a cultured man unless he has been brought up in a really cultured home and has imbibed a family tradition of culture. And this is precisely what the rank and file of our school-teachers have not done; and the same is true of the rank and file of our parents, whose education in this age of progress is, as a rule, considerable behind the standard of their children. Moreover, so long as school-teaching is the worst paid profession in the world, no improvement will be effected.

Meantime, this much is essential. Granted that the mass of rough breaking-in work in school must be done by those poor ill-paid, half-educated drudges struggling for their bread and butter, it ought to be regarded as vital to the work of education to have, at least divided out among the classes, a number of really high-class cultured schoolmasters who, during the year the pupils pass under their hand, can fill up the deficiencies of the rest of the staff, and do something towards wakening the first beginnings of culture—which, when once started. can be carried on by the pupils themselves for the rest of their lives. I should suggest that out of the seven classes which compose an ordinary school, two of this kind should be provided—the first half way up, to give the starting to the spirit of culture, the other near the top to give it a final lift. In an ordinary English school of

the old type these two classes should be (1) the class in which the back of the Latin grammar has been broken, and the boys begin to be capable of entering into the spirit of classical literature; (2) the class in which history has begun to be studied with some seriousness, and the boys are of an age to reflect on the casual connection and significance of events. What corresponding arrangements could be made for Indian schools I cannot say, having no experience of their working.

NEGLECT OF ART

It is also important to observe that, even taken at its best, our ordinary educational course provides officially for no department of culture except that of literature (English, French, Latin, Greek, etc.); and even in this department so much energy is directed to grammar, parsing, analysis, etymology, etc., that little place remains for the appreciation of literary beauties as such. As to music, this consists merely in learning to play a few rather jejune, frippery and commonplace pieces, on a piano or violin, and perhaps a few lessons in counterpoint and figured bass analogous rather to mathematics than to art. There is no study of the history of music, the characteristics of the different schools, the lives and methods of the great composers, or the influence which each has exercised on the other—still less anything calculated to cultivate the principles of sound taste. Similarly, drawing is confined merely to copying a figure, no idea being given of art history, the styles of the great masters, the principles of art criticism, etc.

Hence, apart from literature, our normal course of education fails to provide altogether for the arts and the culture connected with the arts, and *per se* turns out its pupils not only ignorant but totally innocent of the bare rudiments of taste. Hence the rarity of coming across any one, even among the really educated classes, who has the least knowledge of painting or architecture or sculpture or the plastic arts.* Where there exists any taste at all, it is either innate but entirely unscientific, and therefore may happen to be right or may be pathetically wrong; or else it has been acquired through the influences of a cultured home, or possibly by personal self-education through reading and travel in later years.

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* Hence the execrable taste which so often pervades our Catholic churches and chapels, both in point of external architecture and of internal decoration—even where fortunes are spent in ambitious and elaborate ornamentation. Hence too the equally execrable taste often exhibited in connection with church music, even by persons who plume themselves on their own culture, and enjoy the reputation of being accomplished musicians in their immediate circle.

CHAPTER XIV

EDUCATIONAL FAILURE

The strictures passed on our current system of education towards the close of the previous section are nothing new or out of the way. It is by this time widely acknowledged that in spite of an unstinted expenditure of money, time and energy, our current education is in the main not education, at least not the thing we aspire to. Though something of education does accrue therefrom, it is recognized that our main achievement is not the formation of character or the infusion of culture, but merely the development of the memory and of mental cleverness in using it. The reason generally assigned for this failure is that our schools are worked too much by cram methods, viz., by forcing masses of text-book fact into a boy's mind, and practicing his dexterity in giving back fact-knowledge when asked for it.

This explanation is no doubt the proximate one, and to it must be added that the organizers of our educational works are in great degree responsible for the prevalence of cram—not so much on account of the curriculum of subjects they impose, but of the kind of knowledge they look for and are satisfied with in examinations. Into this question we do not intend to enter here. What we want to say is that the evil lies deeper down. Even when the assignment of matter and the examination system have been

made ideally perfect, the evil will still remain uncoped with until the rank and file of our school teachers are really cultured men. This they will never be till their qualifications are tested by other standards than those now in vogue—that is to say, until personal character and influence and culture is made the chief qualification, and until mere dexterity in book-work, though demanded, takes quite a secondary place. And nothing will ever raise the rank and file of the profession to this standard, so long as their pay is such as an ordinary copying-clerk would despise.

THE ADULT ENVIRONMENT

But even when this defect on the part of the teaching staff is remedied, the evil will only reveal its roots deeper down—namely, in the almost exclusive prevalence of formal instruction, and the want of that environment of incentive to culture which I have called "informal instruction." But this can be secured only through regular and free intercourse with cultured adult minds—primarily in the home, and secondly, as far as possible in the school.

As regards the home, there are two causes why this cultured environment fails us. First among the educated classes, where there exists a family tradition of culture, family life is at the present time so broken up by the artificial usages and exigencies of modern society and civilization as scarcely to exist any more. I refer to such prevalent practices as residence in hotels and town flats, the engagement in business and social visits during the day, and gymkhanas and clubs and dinings-out by night, the separation of husband

and wife through the exigencies of employment, etc. —the result being that the children are at first habitually relegated to the care of half-educated nurses, and afterwards packed off to a boarding school to get them out of the way. Consequently they see little of their parents, and in any case never enjoy the benefits of the habitual social intercourse with them and the adult friends of the family at any time of their lives. Thus the bringing up of the children is taken out of the hands of the parents and made over to strangers and paid officials; and whatever family tradition of culture there was hitherto, is irrevocably lost. Is it possible to get fashionable parents to realize that by spending their money on nurses and tutors and school- and college-fees they have done but a tithe of their duty towards their offspring; and that it would be an infinitely more worthy employment for them to cherish the fabric of an ideal home circle in which their children could participate, than to be spending all their leisure in outside amusements and occupations which, if they contribute culture to themselves, at least contribute no facilities of culture to their children? And, of course, what is here said of culture applies *a fortiori* to moral training and the formation of character—of which more in the sequel.

Secondly, as regards the less cultured classes, the modern process of education has created a strange, and at the same time, an unavoidable anomaly, viz., that the parents, belonging as they do to an earlier generation, enjoy usually a lower standard of education than their children, and therefore have nothing to offer them in the way of incitement to culture. In

fact, there often arises a weird contrast between the higher and more refined tone of the children who are attending school, and the lower and rougher tone which pervades the home. Hence it is that, while strongly opposed to boarding schools in case of the better educated classes, on account of the separation from home influence which they involve, I consider that in case of the less educated families the boarding school is the lesser of two evils, because the tone inculcated at school is likely to be higher in point of culture than that of the home circle.

With regard to such families, however, something can be done if the parents realize the advantages of education, and do their best (according to their own standard) to raise the tone of their homes, by taking more interest in the various subjects of culture with which they are themselves conversant. But the thing must come naturally or not at all. Forced attempts at "intellectual conversation" among lay-people are only one degree less dismal than forced attempts at "spiritual conversation" among religious novices. They invariably create disgust and defeat their own end, and had better be abandoned without even a trial.

As regards school-masters, if they are desirous to contribute to the real culture of their pupils, they must first thoroughly devote themselves to the acquisition of culture themselves. And this will immediately reflect itself even in their formal instructions in the schoolroom as well as their informal intercourse with the boys outside the school. The question is

how this informal intercourse between the adults of the school staff and the boys can be more effectually worked? On this point I have two suggestions to make.

TWO EXPEDIENTS

The first is an object-lesson taken from the English public school system. At Eton, for instance, the boys are not herded barrack-wise together and isolated from intercourse with the teaching staff. They are drafted off into groups, each of which lives like an adopted family with one of the married masters, who superintends the boys' private studies in the capacity of tutor, while both he and his wife preside over the table at meals—thus affording to the boys a fair substitute for home life and giving a tone to the entire group. The system is felt to work excellently well; but whether it could be adopted elsewhere I will not venture to opine. It illustrates, however, the point under consideration.

Given that the barrack-system must pervail, the only remaining question is whether any other provision can be made for informal intercourse with the adult minds of the college staff in the way desired. One suggestion occurs to me; and it is, to ask whether some arrangement could not be made (as part of the school system) for an organized series of walks, expeditions, entertainments, visits to objects of interest, etc., in which object-lessons of a mind-forming nature could be combined with conversational instruction concerning them on the part of the masters? I am told that in a certain large day-school

In Bombay there is an incredible proportion of boys who have never seen Bombay Harbor (ten minutes away) and in fact have never seen a ship. With such an eloquent fact before us, there is hardly need to say more in recommendation of the following scheme:—

(1) A visit to the Bombay Docks, taking groups of boys about and explaining to them the construction of the vessels, the methods of lading and unlading, the imports and exports, the articles imported and exported, where they come from and where they go to, and what use is made of them—a comprehensive lesson in geography, to be repeated afterwards with the aid of maps in the schoolroom.

(2) Visit to a man-of-war, with suitable explanations of its structure and working, and the organization and distribution of the British Navy, etc., etc.

(3) A short tour round the best parts of the city, in order to point out the public buldings, their origin and use, their different styles of architecture, etc.

(4) A visit to a cotton mill, explaining the material used, the process of manufacture, the objects produced, and their distribution to the market.

(5) Visit to an iron-foundry, an observatory, an ice-factory, a stone quarry, a printing press, the Reay School of Art, etc., conducted in the same manner.

(6) Arrangements with cinematograph proprietors about special entertainments for school boys at reduced rates, the subjects being selected with a view to instruction.

(7) Expeditions into the country for the study of nature—scenery, botany, zoology, geology, etc.

(8) Regular magic-lantern lectures on subjects of general interest—travel, elementary science, industries, architecture, painting, etc.

All these things, on some small scale at first, could surely be organized by any college staff possessing the main elements of culture. They could be made part of the curriculum—the time given to them being taken slightly from study hours, and chiefly from play-hours—involving as they do healthy exercise and a shake-up quite as profitable as games. I do not mean to work out the idea or to solve difficulties in the way. It is enough to have given the hint.

SELF-EDUCATION

Let us now turn to another aspect of the same subject. We have previously insisted on the fundamental truth that all real training means self-training, and we can now give this proposition a new form, viz., that all real education means self-education. But this latter proposition, running as it does rather counter to the ordinary modes of expression, needs to be rightly understood; and this seems to be the psychological moment for its explanation.

It is not an uncommon experience to come across a certain type of individual known concisely as a "self-made man." The self-making thus alluded to means that he began poor and has worked himself up to riches; that he originally belonged to the lower strata of society and has raised himself, in some way at least, into the higher strata. Living half a day on board a steamer with one of these self-made men is enough to reveal his weak points to an average ob-

server. Some of them are unassuming and free from affectation or ostentation in the use of their wealth—thoroughly passable in fact, except possibly for their bad accent. From this altogether favorable specimen at one end of the scale, they graduate steadily down from insufferable monuments of vulgar pride and insolence at the other. The point to notice is that everybody gives credit to the self-made man for his industry and perseverance in the struggle for life, and for his talents in having risen so far from such low beginnings. But at the same time the stamp of self-manufacture is usually branded indelibly on his every word and action, just like "Made in Bavaria" on a graphite pencil.

It is not uncommon, too, to come across an analogous type of being whom we call not the self-made but the self-educated man. This means a man whose family tradition was pretty low in the matter of education; whose schooling has been meagre and mediocre; but who, by private industry in "self-improvement" has managed to make up for these deficiencies to some degree—that is, as far as isolated and unaided industry can do it. The result is a man with a fairly active and developed mind, stocked with perhaps a good deal above the average of knowledge, which he is not slow in airing in conversation. Hence he will give the impression of being a well-informed man—sometimes exasperatingly so when he begins to take one to task for inaccuracy in points of fact. In some cases a certain inborn refinement enables him to acquire real culture; but more generally there will be a certain crudness and want of grace about his accom-

plishments which reveals that his culture is "not to the manner born." The question immediately arises, therefore: What is the secret of the fault which we can so easily detect, and which marks off the self-educated man from the man who has been educated in the proper sense of the word? The answer is a simple one. It is all summed up in the saying of Emerson already quoted, that "to make one cultured man you must have a whole society of such." Culture in its substantial perfection is possible only where it is the product of an atmosphere, the outcome of a tradition. This tradition is the accumulation of generations of progress, and is only reachable through habitual intercourse with those who possess it themselves. If a man tries to build up culture isolated from such an atmosphere or tradition, he deserves credit for the attempt; but being so handicapped and out of touch his success will be far from complete.

When speaking, therefore, of all real education as self-education, I do not mean self-education in the sense of isolated efforts after self-improvement on the part of the individual. What I mean is that, given the necessary atmosphere and tradition in the home and the school, the results will depend mainly on the way in which the boy, *sua sponte,* accepts these advantages, and the use he makes of them. To put it philosophically—the home and college atmosphere and tradition are merely environment; and environment does not work on the faculties so as to bring about their development, but merely affords so many means by which the faculties can develop themselves. It is true that nature is so spontaneously responsive

to external influences, that a boy living in such an atmosphere is sure to receive some impress from it, even without any conscious or deliberate effort on his own part. But if he is to become really a man of culture he must take up the business of education in real earnest for himself; and when this is wanting, no satisfactory results will accrue from forcing him against his will. Hence, admitting that some modicum of outward pressure may be advisable, this must be regarded as medicinal and accessory—chief aim of the educator being to arouse the interest of the pupil in the work of self-culture so as to get him to strive for himself, out of a motive of interest and not out of a motive of compulsion. How to excite this interest and to rouse this energy in the young is the main problem in the art of training. It is merely emphasizing the foregoing contentions to say that the effect will not be produced mainly by formal instruction or formal discipline, but by informal instruction and discipline in the sense explained. But the chief agent, to which these are accessory, will always be example —that is to say, the simple contagion which comes themselves an object-lesson of the culture which the boy must aspire to, and being such, an immediate incentive to imitation. But of this later.

What we have said in regard to secular knowledge and culture, applies with equal force to moral and religious development, and that so obviously as to need no enlargement.

CHAPTER XV

INFORMAL DISCIPLINE AND EXAMPLE

What has already been said of the distinction between formal and informal instruction applies *mutatis mutandis,* with equal force to formal and informal discipline. By formal discipline is meant that code of rules and regulations which, whether drawn up in printed form or merely assumed as customary usage, have the nature of laws which must be observed, and which cannot be ignored or contravened with impunity. There may be a good deal of informality about the presentation of the code, which is often taken for granted rather than promulgated. But the code is there all the same; and as soon as anything is done contrary to it, the child is liable to be checked, and ultimately to be punished.

Thus the essential note of formal discipline is that of an external restraint on liberty, and, like formal instruction, has therefore the nature of a burden or a task.

Informal discipline, on the contrary, is a suggestion rather than a law. It leaves liberty intact, and has nothing of the drill or parade-ground about it. The boy does not feel himself liable to be called officially to account for his correspondence or want of correspondence with it; and the only incentive attached to it is the appeal which it makes to his better nature, backed up by the manifest approval of

the parents or others from whom this kind of discipline is derived.

Informal discipline is somewhat more difficult to illustrate by example than informal instruction. It consists in a certain influence exercised on the conduct of the child, not through any kind of set injunction but through the existence of a "tone" prevailing in the family circle or in the school—with which certain kinds of conduct are at once felt to be in harmony, and others out of harmony. Perhaps the clearest illustration can be found in the matter of conduct at table. Obviously among cultured circles nothing like rudeness or boorish manners will be dreamt of. But there are three degrees of strictness recognized, namely, the formal, the semi-formal and the domestic or homely. The formal is practiced in strictly society-dinners, the semi-formal in private dinners with a group of friends, the third in the privacy of the family. It clearly belongs to discipline to know precisely which of these standards to assume on each occasion. In case a boy shows himself notably wanting in the requisite manner, he will of course be submitted to formal discipline—that is to say he will be told exactly how he must behave under the penalty of banishment from the table. But when a good family tradition exists, the boys will pick up the right practice without any instruction at all—merely by observation, and out of the desire to do the proper thing. In this case the discipline will be informal—that is, the tradition of the family will be accepted freely and acted upon out of a natural sense of propriety, and not out of a feeling of compulsion. The same idea will per-

vade the whole range of manners in every department —the right kind of conduct being learnt simply by observing how the elders behave themselves and by acting accordingly.

TONE OF A SCHOOL

Similarly, everybody knows what an immense educational value there is in what we call the "tone" of a school. I remember meeting a young man from an English public school—I think it was Taunton—who told me that there existed a tradition that every Taunton boy was a gentleman and must act as such; that part of his code of gentlemanliness was not to use bad language and not to smoke—and why? Simply because the traditional tone of the school forbade the first, and an express rule forbade the second. If any youngster was found infringing this code, it was not necessary for the staff to intervene. The sixth-form —who were the monitors, I think—simply took the matter in their own hands in a constitutional way, and gave the youth a sound thrashing, or condemned him to run the gauntlet—to teach him that "if he wants to be a Taunton boy he must learn to behave like one." This serves well to bring out what informal discipline means as regards schools. I was also told by another young man that the same tone existed at the Oratory School, Edgbaston, and was kept up in much the same manner. Even among certain schools where formal discipline is greatly to the fore, something has been done to introduce a similar system—an account of the first experiments at Beaumont College, Old

Windsor, having been printed in the *Examiner* a few years ago.

Again the same idea recurs. We have said that all real training is self-training, and that all real education is self-education. And now we may add that all real discipline is helf-discipline. Enforced conformity to a code of rules must not of course be depreciated, for undoubtedly it is necessary and cannot be dispensed with. But the great aim and object of the disciplinarian ought to be this—to make the code of compulsory rules as unnecessary as possible; or in other words, to get a boy so interested in his own self-management that he will take it in hand freely for himself, and will learn to conduct himself reasonably and in an orderly manner even when all compulsion of rule has been removed. If this is not in the main achieved, school-discipline is a miserable police-affair, which keeps the boys in order just so far as they are under inspection, and with the fear of the rod before their eyes; but which leaves them internally as ill disciplined as an untrained horse. The consequence is they will kick over the traces as soon as they get the least chance. Nay, further, they will even take a special pleasure in lawlessness when school is over, as a sort of compensation and revenge for the irksome restraints under which they have so long chafed.

CONCERNING EXAMPLE

It will already have become manifest how closely informal instruction and informal discipline are bound up with example. But now it is time to turn to that, the third and last means of training at our disposal.

In order to distinguish example from the two former modes of influence we must compare them thus. Informal instruction is that which is impressed on the mind by conversation, sight-seeing, reading, etc.; while informal discipline is that which is impressed on the will by the prevalence of a certain "tone" in the social circle. So far as these influences present themselves merely as objective ideas, for the child to adopt for himself because of their innate attractiveness, they retain the nature of instruction and discipline respectively. But as soon as the influence springs directly from *persons* as such, it assumes the character of "example."

There is a certain appearance of mystery about the notion of example. For why my doing a particular thing should be so potent in inducing others to do the same, is certainly by no means obvious. But with the aid of a little philosophy things become clearer, and the mystery dwindles down—though it never vanishes altogether.

Taken in its simplest form, example is a direct appeal to the natural instinct of imitation. To say that people follow the example of others because of their instinct of imitation is not carrying us very far, however; for it leaves unexplained what this instinct of imitation is. Reduced to its roots, it simply means that a human being is a bundle of pent-up forces ready to issue in action as soon as an occasion offers. The various powers of the body and soul are like so many cylinders of compressed gas, which only need the tap turning to rush out with a fizz. On account of the compression of the gas the cylinders are in a frightful

state of tension, and are liable to burst if you handle them carelessly. And if they were endowed with sense they would feel extremely tight and uncomfortable, and would experience a great sense of relief in finding an outlet. Now since human beings are also a collection of cylinders called powers or faculties, and have sensibility in addition, this is exactly what they do feel, especially when young—viz., that they are brimfull of energy, and dying to let some of it out as soon as possible. Witness the gambollings and caperings of lambs and pups and kittens, to which the restless activity of young children is closely similar.

WHY CHILDREN IMITATE

These pent-up forces are the first element in the "instinct of imitation." The second is the fact that the various faculties are actuated or excited to activity by the presence of a suitable object. That is to say, every time the idea of some kind of action is suggested from without, the tap of the corresponding cylinder is opened, and the pent-up force rushes out in the form of action. The consequence is, as soon as the child sees any one doing something, immediately the idea occurs: "Why should I not try and do the same?" And sure enough, if the thing is feasible he will begin to do it—with no other motive except to give expression to the vital energies boxed up within. This elementary instinct of imitation begins to show itself as soon as the faculty of observation is awakened. Children all tend to do what they see their elders doing. They see their mother nursing a baby, and immediately feel the need of a doll. They see the servants doing household

work, and immediately want to keep house themselves. Their first visit to a shop initiates playing shop at home. As soon as they find a companion with a toy pistol they must have one too. If one boy begins to jump over a ditch all the rest will immediately follow. Whatever they read in their story-books about desert islands and hidden treasure, and scalpings, and sledging, and hunting, and living in caves must be imitated —the kitchen wood-axe serving for a tomahawk, and the cellar steps for a cave. Parents sometimes wonder at the facility with which their Tommy dear picks up every thing bad among his companions at school. They interpret this to mean an unusually wicked disposition; whereas, as a matter of fact, it may mean nothing more than a special dose of the instinct of imitation. Later on, when the youngster begins aspiring to the man, he will commence by seizing on the salient but accidental features of smoking and drinking, and think he is doing finely—although he finds the taste of smoke and drink atrocious, and would never think of touching either of them except for the instinct of imitation.

REFLEX IMITATION

But imitation does not remain in this simple stage of activity for its own sake. Experience soon shows that specific pleasures are attached to certain actions, and specific pains to certain others. When the boy sees a pleasurable action performed by another, his attention is thereby drawn to it; and knowing the pleasure attached to it, he will set about performing it for the sake of that specific pleasure, and not merely from a love of activity in general. On the other hand, where

he sees the performance of an unpleasant action he will not be drawn to it by example, but will rather be repelled by reason of its ascertained painfulness.

A higher stage in the working of example begins as soon as the boy's rational nature is involved, and he becomes capable of aspiring after ideals. This aspiration after ideals is something no less instinctive in human nature than the simple instinct of imitation, and the more complex instinct regarding pleasure. As the sensitive faculties are susceptible to pleasure and pain, so the rational faculties are susceptible to good and evil—the healthy instinct of the will being to seek good and eschew evil, wherever the sensitive attractions of pleasure and repulsions of pain do not override this disposition. Those who have watched the favorable development of the young will have noticed a well-marked though gradual expansion which takes place, sometimes earlier and sometimes later; the chief feature of which is an attraction—somewhat sentimental and romantic—towards everything that is noble, chivalrous, good and true, and an aspiration towards the realization of these qualities in the self. It is this instinct which leads to the formation of that ideal which ought to dominate the later developments of life; and the formation of this ideal will in turn depend in a great measure on the atmosphere of informal instruction, discipline and example with which the boy is surrounded. If the adult company with which he mixes consists of men and women of high ideals and noble character, everything they do will be an object-lesson to him. For on perceiving the excellence of their character as manifested in conduct, he will first

appreciate it and admire it, and this will soon suggest the feeling that "this is the kind of man I should like to be." Finding in his environment, ready-made and in concrete form, the ideal which he aspires to form he will assimilate it with ease, recognize its possibility of achievement, and begin to live according to it—aided therein by the instinct of imitation already described. If, on the other hand, he is surrounded by persons of low ideals and character, not only will he fail to find the materials for his own ideal, but is likely enough to have all aspirations towards the ideal killed out of him, and will settle down to the low standard of utilitarianism, pleasure seeking and self-indulgence prevalent in his environment. Again, if he finds himself thrown into the barrack life of school, with nothing but boys like himself for his associates, he may possibly gather a few elements of an ideal from some of the nobler specimens of boy nature around him; but he will be, on the whole, bereft of those influences of adult-example which are so necessary, or at least so helpful in the process.

This is enough for the present to emphasize once more what we have insisted on so much already, viz., the important place occupied in the education of the young by the adult influences with which they are surrounded, and the importance of ensuring that their education should *always* be carried on in an adult environment, if it is to issue in anything worthy of the name.

CHAPTER XVI

MORAL TEACHING IN SCHOOLS.

In the foregoing articles our illustrations of formal and informal instruction and discipline were drawn more from the departments of knowledge, manners, taste, culture and practical enterprise than from the more important department of moral conduct—leaving the application to the intelligence of our readers. This, in case of Catholic trainers and Catholics generally will be easy enough. But in view of the agitation just now going on outside about "moral teaching in schools," it seems well to devote a special article to the relation which formal instruction and informal discipline bear to each other in the conveyance of morals.

A writer in *Indian Education* gives us the starting point for our theme. His first utterance (April 1909) consists in the asking of five questions, with a manifest implication as to the answer expected:—

1. Did I obtain more moral benefit at school and college in England, from scripture lessons, compulsory chapels and "divers"; or from games, school discipline, and healthy school and college public opinion and the example of my masters?

2. In *all* the religions of India, is the teaching of the religion the teaching of morality?

3. Are the paid exponents of the religion, who would presumably teach it, invariably the exponents both with their lips and in their lives, of morality?

4. Can morality be crammed from a hand-book?

5. Are the boys of "religious" schools manifestly better behaved than those of Government schools?

Soon afterwards the *Times of India* wrote thus:—

"Whatever their politics all must be agreed that it is to the interest of any State that its citizens should grow up imbued with high moral principles. *At present our educational system inculcates none at all.*"

This provoked the same writer to express himself once more; this time in fine ironic strain:—

How beautiful (my brethren) is the first of the above sentences, and how terrible is the indictment of the Education Department contained in the italicized one! And how much more terrible would it be if it contained a grain of truth! However, it were a pity to let such a consideration hamper a fine criticism, or spoil the rounding of a period.

We teach neither Bible, Vedas, Koran, Granth, Talmud nor Dhammapadas, nor even a hotch-potch of the lot, acceptable to none and disgusting to all. How *can* we then inculcate "high moral principles"?

These of course flourish best in the atmosphere of temple and mosque; and priest and mullah are their "sole purveyors." They can never exist in schools which do not "teach religion," or at least ladle out moral teaching as per text-book, syllabus and time-table. Even in these schools (the "national" variety for example) some boys seem to get to Standard VII in intelligence and yet can't pass the Standard I examination in morals. Others seem to get full marks in morals, and yet do such naughty little deeds as—murder, for instance.

In a Government School the boys get no moral training, of course, through the discipline of school life, school public opinion and school law. There is none in the precept and practice of the staff, none in the playing-fields, none in the actual work of the classroom.

What moral training can there be through contact with upright, honorable, scholarly gentlemen? What training in esprit-de-corps, courage, hardiness, cooperation, unselfishness, self-reliance, good temper and general manliness is there in football, hockey and cricket? (What nonsense was it that Wellington talked about Waterloo and the playing-fields of Eton?)

What moral training can there be in sound and scientific education and its training in observation, deduction, accuracy, perseverance, attention and application through study? Silly idea, isn't it?

"At present our educational system inculcates none at all," not even by a daily training and experience in the fact that every kind of wrong doing is punished, and that right conduct is rewarded—or is its own reward. . . .

As for the unruliness of lads and their disrespectful conduct to their parents and elders—reference to *one* religious work certainly would shed a little light. The wise King Solomon knew how to deal with such. He recommended neither one religion, nor a medley of "basic truths" from several, but a basic application of the birch. [*Indian Education,* July 1909.]

So far the writer. It is not my intention to enter into direct discussion with him. But the point under-

lying his sarcasm is one calculated to arrest attention and comes very appropriate to our present subject.

INFORMAL VERSUS FORMAL

In the previous sections we dealt at some length with the difference between formal and informal instruction and discipline; and it would seem that the writer in *Indian Education* has a similar distinction in mind. The discipline of school life; school public opinion and school law; the precept and practice of the staff, in the playing fields, in the work of the class room; contact with upright honorable scholarly gentlemen; *esprit de corps,* courage, hardiness, co-operation, unselfishness, self-reliance, good temper and general manliness in football, hockey and cricket; training in observation, deduction, accuracy, perseverance, attention, application through study; all kinds of wrong doing punished and right conduct rewarded—or its own reward; the basic application of the birch, etc., etc.,—these pertain for the most part to what we have called informal instruction and discipline, as distinguished from formal instruction — which the writer goes on contemptuously to specify as 'Bible, Vedas, Koran, etc.; ladling out moral teaching as per text-book, syllabus and time-table'; moral stories told perfunctorily in cold blood, while the tongue of the human boy reposeth in his cheek, etc.

We should be the last, after what has been written, to undervalue the informal both in instruction and discipline. On the contrary we should rather be the first to emphasize its importance—as we have indeed been doing, to no uncertain tune, in the sections already

mentioned. On the other hand, we should be equally ready to endorse severe strictures against formal instruction, when conducted in such a manner as to make it odious, tedious and repulsive to the young—as possibly is often done where the lessons are worked at high pressure and by rote, as a task to be got over so as to make room for something more secular and more interesting. Finally and for the foregoing reasons, we should be prepared to go a long way with the writer in repudiating, in its sweeping generality, the statement that at present our educational system inculcates no high moral principles at all. For so long as a healthy discipline based implicitly on ethical principles is enforced in a school, so far is *something* being done in the direction of moral training.

DICK RODNEY AT SCHOOL

It is when we try and get under the surface of things that the ground of dispute becomes clear. In the first place, a distinction must be made between right conduct imposed from without, and right conduct which springs from within. This distinction can be illustrated as follows:—

Let us take a group of boys, already well-trained in every sense of the word, and established in the habit of acting according to the teaching they have received. Take these boys and construct a school out of them. In that school let there be a proper code of discipline, reward and punishment, etc., but let the curriculum of the school be limited to secular knowledge, and the enforcement of that discipline, without any express instruction in religious or moral prin-

ciples. Those boys will nevertheless give an excellent tone to the school by virtue of their previous training; and the public opinion identified with that tone will have the effect of keeping up the results, at least for a time. Lying, cheating, and obscenity will be looked upon as "detestable"; slyness, mischief-making, and shirking punishment, as "mean"; and unfair play, churlishness and loss of temper as "caddish." The ideal state will probably not last for long unless kept up by the express inculcation of religious and moral principles. But still, let us pass that over for the time.

Introduce into this school a new boy, Dick Rodney by name, who has never had the same advantages of training—a boy full of the ordinary instincts of boy-nature—the instincts of seeking pleasure and shirking pain, the instincts of pride and self-conceit, of ambition to have the best of everything—and utterly devoid of any reflex principles of morality. At first the contrast will be enormous; and Dick Rodney will be voted a ruffian, a barbarian, and a cad. His companions will, of course, not put up with him to any great extent. They will feel the necessity of combing him down, and will set to work at the task in good earnest. Observe, I am supposing the most favorable case—that the good tone of the school is exceedingly strong, and that the power of evil on the part of the newcomer weak—so that he does not succeed in spreading his vices and savageries among the rest, but is really taken in hand by the boys and steadily reduced to order. Let us on this supposition see what will happen.

Dick Rodney will find himself harassed and thwarted on all sides. By doing this or that he falls under the code of discipline and is punished, and thus learns that law is a force outside him which he must yield to or suffer. Taskes unfulfilled bring him a penalty; rowdiness, and tricks in school, ditto; lying, cheating and using foul language, ditto. But besides this there is the unwritten code of the boys themselves. If he shows temper he is laughed at; if he disobeys the captain he is punched; if he shows fight he is thrashed or jeered at. Cad, howler, bounder, hooligan, become his nicknames.

In short he soon finds himself hedged round by forces to which he sees clearly he must conform if he would have any peace, and impressed by a standard of conduct which he must himself adopt if he is to secure credit and become acceptable to his fellows. Pride and insubordination tempt him to stand out as long as possible; but the environment soon proves too strong and too persistent, and then both pride and policy alike dictate surrender. The result is, after a few months Dick Rodney turns out—superficially at least—quite a presentable fellow; one who will pass muster among the rest, and even be counted satisfactory by the officials who have to give an account of him.

EFFECTS OF HIS TRAINING

All this is excellent testimony to the training influence of the discipline, public opinion and tone of the school. But how deep does it go?—that is the question.

Not very deep, as we shall soon see. According to our supposition, the only training the boy has ever had is the informal training of his surroundings. He knows that so long as he remains at that school he must not do this and that, or he shall suffer for it in many ways. But how will he naturally view these various restraints? As a matter of fact, the boy may possibly learn now and then that the prohibitions are not merely arbitrary, but are based on the idea that some actions are moral and some are immoral. And so, if there is anything of good in the boy, he may gradually pick up a glimmering of ethics, and begin to develop a conscience, and principles by which conscience is guided. But this is all accidental. We are supposing a clean-cut case in order to bring out our point. The boy, we are assuming, has never heard anything of morality as such, or of a moral law according to which some actions are right and others wrong in themselves. Still less has he any idea of duty to God, the creator and author of that moral law Nor (*ex supposito*) is any such idea conveyed to him by those around him. Both masters and boys, we assume, simply take the code as an accepted fact and punish summarily all infringements of it, without giving instruction as to any moral principle underlying it, and without any appeal to the laws of ethics as such, or to religion or to conscience. The whole system of things therefore presents itself to that boy as a system of "taboo"; a code of penal laws; the imposition of a collective will upon the individual will—and that is all. This is what informal discipline re-

duces itself to, if not backed up by the express instilling of ethical principles.

After he has been fairly groomed, and has got all the good which can be got out of the informal discipline of environment, Dick Rodney leaves the school and once more breathes the air of liberty. Being thrown into the world to sink or swim, he will find out sooner or later that there is informal discipline to be faced there as well as at school. Employer has his demands, customers have their demands, fellow-workers have their demands, society has its demands, and finally the police have their demands. If he begins to throw off self-restraint he will soon find himself in a quandary. If he is shrewd, he will realize that his training at school has a value for after-life; and that the infringement of the code of his new environment carries punishment with it, sometimes far more serious than a "basic application of the birch" had ever proved. Under this reflection he may buckle to and begin to resume self-restraint as part of the policy of getting on in life—but on no other or higher motive, for he has learnt none.

But even in the best case, self-restraint is likely to last only as long as its perceived necessity lasts. Place him in a situation where he is freed from external restraints, where he can indulge his lawless impulses with impunity; and the result will show how superficial, how transient the effects of his school-discipline are. Or, even in ordinary circumstances, let anything like a strong temptation come upon him, and a fair chance of not being caught by the police, and it seems almost certain what will follow. And why? Because

the whole of his training has been due to forces acting from without, and not to the building-up of moral principles within.

WHAT MORAL PRINCIPLES MEAN

By moral principles I mean maxims of conduct deeply impressed on the mind in the form of conscientious duties, and accepted by the mind as absolute and permanent rules for action. The formula of external compulsion is simple, "I *must,* because I am forced." The formula of expediency is, "I had *better* do this, because it pays; or not do that because it does not pay." The formula of ethics is, "I *ought,* even though I need not. I ought, even though it may not pay." Such and such conduct is right in itself. It is the dictate of the law of right—that categorical imperative, which stands absolute, regardless of the consequences.— *Fiat justitia, ruat coelum.* Loss of life, loss of goods (however much I may value them) are quite second in importance when it is a question of doing the right. This is the essential notion of morality; that no material or temporal advantage can compare in value with simple adhesion to the right, because that value is absolute, while all other values are relative. And "high moral principles" are nothing but a collection of specific dictates regarding the right, impressed on the mind, accepted and assimilated and set up as the standards of judgment and action. Dick Rodney, from the very nature of his training, has learnt nothing of such principles—even though he may have learnt, for the time, to do some of the things which such principles (if they existed in him)

would dictate. And because he has merely learnt to do these things under external pressure, and has not learnt to do them as the outcome of principles, therefore his improved conduct at school is not morality, but only *coincident* with morality. For the same reason it is only skindeep, and will not long survive the removal of the outside pressure which forced him for a time to do as well as he did.

But here is an objection to be raised. If informal discipline has its failures, so has formal instruction in morality its failures too. How often do we not hear of boys who have been brought up under a perfect system of religious and moral instruction all their home-life, and all their school-life too, turning out lamentable as soon as they are set to face the world and to manage their lives for themselves. Let us admit it, and ask what follows? Such boys are certainly not the worse for their moral and religious training; for if they turn out badly it is not because of it but in spite of it. And there ought to be at least a better chance of their coming round again after sowing their wild oats, if they have within them the substratum of high moral principles, than if they had none. This much must be at least conceded.

But discrepancy of results, both ways, is one of the anomalies of human life. Some are gifted with an innate moral disposition which seems to make them almost independent of instruction and training, whether formal or informal—who seem born to turn out well. Others are so deficient in the root-instincts of morality that they will always turn out badly, no matter how much is done for them. Again, there are

some who will be good as gold until a strong temptation comes; while others seem weak in character till some hard trial comes to bring their strength out. Thus it is true that theoretical training, however excellent, has its failures as well as practical training. But still, our calculations are not to be upset by these contingencies. What we have to look to is the system which is of itself and *ceteris paribus* is calculated to produce the best result.

In this matter we can enumerate two extreme views —the first, of those who lay such stress on informal training as to ignore and despise the formal; and the second, of those who lay such stress on the formal as to ignore the informal. The sound view, as usual, lies in the golden mean—recognizing both as essential, and each as complementary to the other. Formal instruction is necessary in order to instill a clear grasp of principles; informal discipline is necessary in order to reduce those principles to habitual practice. The preaching of moral principles by itself will not, at least uniformly, issue in practical results. I say not uniformly, because, while there are some boys who, as soon as they hear a principle, tend by their nature to assimilate it and reduce it to practice, there are also others of quite the contrary disposition—from whose minds moral instruction runs like water off a duck's back; and who need strict and persevering discipline as well before any deep impression can be made. Therefore formal instruction without informal discipline will not work as a system; and all the strictures against *ex professo* moral teaching are well deserved, where such teaching taken alone is claimed to

be the whole thing by itself. On the other hand, informal discipline without formal instruction—on which the writer in *Indian Education* lays so much stress—will not do by itself either. "Morality without tenets"—as his Excellency the Governor described it the other day—is not unlike multiplication without the multiplication table—Nay, it is worse. It is like trying to work multiplication without the knowledge of the properties of number on which multiplication rests. For morality—let us emphasize the point once more—is not simply a *de facto* conformity to a code of conduct imposed by the collective will on the individual will. It is more than this. It is a code of conduct imposed by the inherent rightness of things, having duty as its counterpart, and principles as its formulation, conscience as its dictator, and a supreme lawgiver as its ultimate source. Without these characteristics you may talk of utilitarianism, or custom, or convention, or social propriety or what you like; but you cannot talk of morality in any proper sense of the word—and in the sense in which morality is at the present time felt to be so serious a desideratum in our schools.

CHAPTER XVII

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

The foregoing answer to the third and last question brings our programme to a close. Not that the subject is exhausted, or even adequately treated. For the more the matter is worked into, the more do its possibilities expand, until the practical difficulty is not how to go on but how to stop. We intend, therefore, to conclude the present series at this point, leaving it to a future occasion to work over some of the principal parts in greater detail. The closure is opportune because, by giving a general answer to the three questions proposed at the beginning, we have, in general outline at least, covered the whole ground—so that anything else which remains to be said in future will be only an amplification of the principles already laid down, or a study of their detailed application. We shall therefore occupy this concluding section in drawing up a summary of the course, so as to refresh the memory of our readers and to place the whole scheme under one comprehensive view.

GENERAL SUMMARY

The object of the series is to discuss the training of the young under a scheme of three questions:— (1) What sort of result do we want our training to produce? (2) What sort of material is given us out of which to produce that result? (3) How are we to

handle that material so as to bring the desired result about?

(*A*) The first question is: *What sort of men do we wish our children to turn out?* Taking a surface view, what we look for is a certain all-round development of knowledge, intelligence, judgment, moral and religious uprightness, strength and stamina, energy and enterprise, refinement and culture proportional to the status of each. But if we would pass beneath the surface we want something more than this. What we really want is *Character.*

(1) Character is life dominated by principles, as distinguished from life dominated by mere impulses from within and mere circumstances from without.

(2) Principles are conceptions deeply rooted in the mind, elevated into standards of judgment, taste, feeling, and action, and consistently applied to life.

(3) A collection of principles covering all departments of life constitutes *an ideal.* A man of principles is therefore a man with an ideal.

(4) There cannot be character without some ideal, but there can be ideals without character. To be effective, an ideal must be not merely pictured, admired, or longed for. It must be embodied in a set of definite principles dominating life, and then it will result in character.

(5) But there can be people of good and also of bad character, according as their ideals and principles are good or bad; and even good ideals admit degrees of goodness.

(6) Therefore the business of training is, first to lay before the child the best and noblest ideal; sec-

ondly, to get that ideal stamped into his mind in the concrete form of sound principles; thirdly, so firmly to establish the habit of acting according to those principles that it will last for the rest of his life.

For practical purposes we can treat ideals under three heads:—(*a*) The *worldly ideal,* which is the natural gentleman; (*b*) The *religious ideal,* which is the model Christian; and (*c*) The *all-round ideal* which, besides Christian and gentleman, comprises every kind of excellence whether physical, intellectual, emotional, moral or practical not already covered by the other two heads. This leads to a number of studies on the relations which subsist between natural and religious ideals, between the Christian and the gentleman, between cleverness and goodness, and between the natural and the supernatural, etc.

In training the young we must always observe a proper subordination of parts according to their importance—placing the Christian ideal over that of the natural gentleman, and both over the accessory elements of the all-round ideal. But still, taken comprehensively, our ambition is to do justice to everything which goes to the making of a human being perfect in all respects.

(*B*) The second question: *What sort of material is given us out of which to produce this result?* We begin by dividing life into the five stages of babyhood, childhood, boyhood, youth and manhood. If these stages were separated one from another we should simply treat the baby as a plant; the child as an animal; and the boy as an incipient man. But since

the various stages come gradually and overlap each other, these three methods of treatment have to be combined—or rather, each higher method must be introduced in turn as soon as the subject shows the corresponding capacity, and each lower method must be retained or fallen back on so far as the lower stage is still in possession. The important thing, however, is to realize that the baby-stage and the child-stage are merely temporary and transient; and hence the corresponding methods should be abandoned as soon as the growth of the subject allows.

The baby-stage, purely such, is of short duration. During childhood, the fields offered for training are observation and impulse, and also the beginnings of judgment and will, just so far as they manifest themselves. The boy-stage begins with what is called "the use of reason" which means consciousness of the power of choice, right and wrong choice, and the duty of right choice. It is important to note that the real break in life lies not between boyhood and manhood, but between childhood and boyhood. Hence the boy must be regarded, not as a "child of larger growth," but as an incipient man; and every opportunity should be given him to develop manliness, by ruling him with man-methods as far as he responds to them, instead of keping up child-methods as long as possible.

The question of free choice leads to the consideration of motives for action: (1) the utilitarian standard; (2) the ethical standard; and (3) the religious standard. The earlier motives of pleasure and pain, punishment and reward, or the will of parents, must be superseded by the idea of duty, which must again

be elevated into personal service of God, and this not merely out of motives of fear, but of love. By this means ethical conduct is placed on a sound footing of religious principle.

Finally, the use of principles must be cultivated till it becomes a habit. This leads to a study, first of the psychological basis of habit (association of ideas); then the physiological basis (motor-reflex activity); and finally the intellectual basis, which is the grasp of sound moral ideas and the constant reference to them as a basis of judgment.

In the whole of the training process we must bear in mind that all real training is self-training; that we have no power to force the will, or encroach on the anatomy of the individual. Consequently success will be achieved only so far as we can induce the boy to take his own self-trainig in hand according to the lines laid out before him.

(C) The third question is: "*What are the means by which to produce the desired result?*" These means are reducible to three:—instruction, discipline and example. A distinction must be made between formal instruction and informal—*formal* being the set task systematically imposed, while *informal* is the outcome of adult intercourse, conversation, observation, spontaneous reading, etc. A similar distinction must be made in case of discipline—the informal being that which naturally arises from the tone of the circle in which the boy lives. An important place in the training of the young must be attributed to this informal instruction and discipline derived from the adult en-

vironment of a well educated home circle. Hence the loss which accrues from the absence of home training, and the disadvantage of the boarding-school system. At the same time the informal must not be over-emphasized so as to despise or dispense with the formal —for without formal instruction principles, as such, can hardly be realized and grasped. Thirdly, *example*, which covers the whole ground of instruction and discipline, is in its own way a more potent factor of influence than either. Besides appealing to the natural instinct of imitation, it reveals the possibilities of achievement, excites the aspirations of the young, helps in the formation of their ideals, and gradually focuses their energies down to a definite line of self-development.

A LAST WORD ON CHARACTER

Having chosen the "Formation of *Character*" as the title of this series, it will be well to obviate possible misconception as to the sense in which the term is used. Character is sometimes understood in a narrower, and sometimes in a wider sense. According to the narrower sense, character means rectitude of religious and moral conduct. Viewed in this light, our aim in training the young will be to turn out a staunch Christian, firm in faith, hope and charity, and of good moral life. There is no doubt that if our training achieves this much it has accomplished the one thing fraught with eternal consequence, and compared with which all else is of minor importance. We confess to having occasionally handled the subject in this nar-

rower sense. But on the whole our scope has been to treat of character in its wider extension. The aim of our training is not simply the religious ideal but the all-around ideal. What we look to produce is not simply the model Christian, but also the proper gentleman, and even, too, the capable all-around man.

If we look back on our original definition of character, we shall soon see that this is what is really meant. Character is life dominated by principles; and therefore it comprehends all life so far as it *can* be dominated by principles. Now life includes not only morality and religion, but also knowledge and judgment and manners and taste and feeling, and every possible kind of activity whether of business or of pleasure. Moreover, there is no single one of these departments which cannot be dominated by principle, and therefore pertain to character.

A few instances will make this clear. Some people have been brought up in such an atmosphere of good manners that they can hardly help being habitually good-mannered themselves. So far as their manners are the mechanical outcome of their surroundings they hardly pertain to character. But so far as a man has reflected upon the principles of manners, and acts under this reflection, so far will his manners pertain to character. Take so simple and homely an instance as the cleaning of one's finger nails. The man of society will never be tempted to neglect this piece of grooming, because society demands it, and he regards no time lost which is devoted to meeting its requirements. But take a man who is bound by no system

of social ties—one who is absorbed say in literary work, and who grudges any time taken from his favorite pursuit. Such a man may constantly find himself engaged in a struggle between the absorbing attractiveness of his work and the duty of keeping up a presentable appearance—out of consideration for others at least, if not for his own sake. Hence arises an exercise of principle, the outcome of which will be at once a manifestation and a development of character. The triviality of the instance only brings out more clearly the point we have in view.

Then secondly, take the question of taste in art. A person who out of simple instinct likes this object or dislikes that is exercising taste, indeed, but it does not so far enter into character. But the man of culture will like this or dislike that, not on mere impulse, but on æsthetical grounds which he can specify. In this way his judgment in art is dominated by principle, and so far will pertain to character. It is well-known how much character can be exhibited in the taste with which a man adorns himself and his surroundings, or the objects of art which he goes to see and loves to dwell upon.

It is true that character in these outlying departments may not have much bearing on character in the pink of perfection in manners and taste may be wholly deficient in the more important spheres of morality and religion. Still, since our scope in training the young is not restricted to anything short of the all-round ideal, all these departments have their proper place in the curriculum, and ought therefore to be included in our treatment of character.

It is well to lay stress on this point, if only as a comfort to those who, having been blessed with an apostolic calling, sometimes wonder how they can be realizing their vocation by the drudgery of imparting secular knowledge when they ought to be saving souls. No doubt there do exist other and more direct means of carrying out their vocation. But still, it should not be forgotten that *all* creatures that are on the face of the earth are given to man to help him towards the end for which he was born (St. Ignatius, Foundation); and that, *all* creatures include not merely objects of religious import but everything which can in any way contribute to the development of human character. Nor is it difficult to find the connection. We have already pointed out how every kind of training which makes towards accuracy of observation and judgment, and judiciousness of action, or which involves self-restraint even in morally colorless matters, contributes also to accuracy of observation and judgment, and to judiciousness of action and self-restraint in moral matters. And he who is taught to act on sound principles concerning things in general, will for that very cause require greater facility in proceeding on sound principles in those things which pertain to the salvation of his soul. Natural development may, it is true, be accompanied by neglect of spiritual development and so lose all higher value. But, given that spiritual development is *not* neglected, it will certainly not be impeded but rather helped by every form of natural development.

But besides this, when we realize the important place played by the informal both in instruction and

discipline, and especially by example; and that by far the greatest influence we may have on those around us is exercised, not so much through the medium of what we *say*, but of what we *do*, and more still of what we *are*—it is manifest that, however unapostolic the work of a schoolmaster may seem on the surface, there is really no greater field for the expenditure of the apostolic spirit than the schoolroom, and all that the schoolroom connotes in any well-regulated school.